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ESSAY
IS ORIGINALISM OUR LAW?
William Baude*
This Essay provides a new framework for criticizing originalism or
its alternatives—the framework of positive law.
Existing debates are either conceptual or normative: They focus either on the nature of interpretation and authority, or on originalism’s ability to serve other values, like predictability, democracy, or general welfare.
Both sets of debates are stalled. Instead, we ought to ask: Is originalism our
law? If not, what is? Answering this question can reorient the debates and
allow both sides to move forward.
If we apply this positivist framework, there is a surprisingly strong
case that our current constitutional law is originalism. First, I argue that
originalism can and should be understood inclusively. That is, it permits doctrine like precedent if those doctrines can be justiﬁed on originalist grounds. Second, I argue that our current constitutional practices demonstrate a commitment to inclusive originalism. In Supreme
Court cases where originalism conﬂicts with other methods of interpretation, the Court picks originalism. By contrast, none of the Court’s putatively anti-originalist cases in fact repudiate originalist reasoning.
These judicial practices are reinforced by a broader convention of treating the constitutional text as law and its origin as the framing. So
while constitutional practice might seem, on the surface, to be a pluralism of competing theories, its deep structure is in fact a nuanced form of
originalism.
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Third, I suggest that originalism’s positive legal status has important normative implications for today’s judges. Judges promise to follow the law, and their judicial authority is premised on the assumption
that they do. So if an inclusive version of originalism is the law, judges
ought not be the ones to change it. Courts ought to privilege our current
legal conventions over academic theories that are anti-originalist and
against narrower forms of originalism as well.
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INTRODUCTION
Debates about originalism are at a standstill, and it is time to move
forward. The current debates are generally either conceptual or normative: The conceptual debates focus “on the nature of interpretation and
on the nature of constitutional authority.”1 Originalists rely on an intuition that the original meaning of a document is its real meaning and that
anything else is making it up. But the intuition is contested: Critics respond that there is no inherent concept of interpretation and that other
countries with written constitutions are not necessarily originalist.2
The normative debates, meanwhile, focus on originalism’s ability to
serve various values, “democratic self-governance, the rule of law, stability, predictability, efficiency, and substantive goodness among them.”3 But
the values are contested, and so are the empirical claims about whether
those values are served and at what expense.
Yet there is a third way to assess originalism—and constitutional theories more broadly—by looking to our positive law, embodied in our legal practice. We ought to ask: Is originalism our law? If not, what is? This
question has been called “one of the two most difficult questions in legal
philosophy.”4 But if it can be answered, it has the potential to reorient the
debates and allow both sides to move forward. This move is the “positive
turn.”5
1. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 37–38 (2009) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Berman, Bunk].
2. See Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation,
158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1025, 1088–91 (2010) (arguing writtenness does not necessarily imply
originalism); Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 Const.
Comment. 193, 193 (2015) (denying inherent concept of interpretation).
3. Berman, Bunk, supra note 1, at 38.
4. Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theories: A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique,
51 San Diego L. Rev. 623, 642 (2014) [hereinafter Alexander, Theories]. Alexander’s other
most difficult question, “how it is possible for law to be normative,” is addressed by Richard
M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), and discussed infra section III.A.
5. The “positive turn” evokes the basic tenets of legal positivism: that the content of
the law is determined by certain present social facts and that moral considerations do not
necessarily play a role in making legal statements true or false. See John Gardner, Legal
Positivism: 5 ½ Myths, 46 Am. J. Juris. 199, 222–25 (2001) [hereinafter Gardner, Legal
Positivism] (“[A]ccording to soft legal positivists, there is no law that depends for its validity on its merits just in virtue of the nature of law, i.e. necessarily.”); Leslie Green, Positivism
and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1035, 1056–57 (2008) (discuss-
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If originalism is the law, then neither the conceptual nor normative
justiﬁcations need to bear as much weight. Originalists need not prove
that originalism is inherent in “the nature” of constitutions or interpretation, just that it is a convention of our interpretation of our Constitution.
Similarly, originalists need not show that originalism is the ﬁrst-best legal
arrangement as a normative matter so long as we agree that government
officials should obey the law. The result would be a defense of originalism that is contingent but truer to our actual commitments.
On the other side, the positive turn provides a surer basis for critics
of originalism who think it is a nefarious and revolutionary dogma. If originalism is not the law, then there is no simple case for why federal judges
have the authority or obligation to be originalist. If something other than
originalism is the law, then there is a ready-made answer to the perennial
originalist challenge, what is the coherent alternative? 6 The legal status quo
is the coherent alternative.
Having framed the question, this Essay argues that a version of
originalism is indeed our law. That version is a somewhat inclusive version of originalism—a version that allows for some precedent, for some
evolving construction of broad or vague language. At the same time, that
version is not inﬁnitely inclusive—it allows for precedent and evolving interpretations only to the extent that the original meaning itself permits them.
In other words: “[T]he original meaning of the Constitution is the ultimate criterion for constitutional law, including of the validity of other
methods of interpretation or decision.”7
I will acknowledge at the outset that this type of originalism may be
frustrating to those who knew originalism in its unruly youth. But as I will
try to show, this deﬁnition is coherent, consistent with much modern originalist scholarship, and most important, consistent with our practice. It
is what Justice Kagan meant when she said that “sometimes [the Framers]
laid down very speciﬁc rules, sometimes they laid down broad principles.
Either way, we apply what they say, what they meant to do. And so, in that
sense, we are all originalists.”8 And it may be what Justice Alito meant when
he said that he is “a practical originalist”: he “start[s] out with originaling moral fallibility of law); Brian Leiter, Why Legal Positivism? 1 (2009) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1521761 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing positivist “slogan” that “‘there is no necessary connection between law and morality’”). But this Essay relies on lawyers’ assumptions rather than technical jurisprudence.
Infra note 80. Indeed, even some “natural law” theorists also agree that many features of a
legal regime are contingent on the social facts of a particular society. See, e.g., John Finnis,
The Truth in Legal Positivism, in The Autonomy of Law 195, 195 (Robert P. George ed.,
1996) (discussing law’s “variability and relativity to time, place, and polity”).
6. I call this the “bear principle,” after Justice Scalia’s oft-repeated parable. See infra
section IV.B.
7. Infra section I.A.
8. Clip: Kagan Conﬁrmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 1 (C-SPAN television broadcast
June 29, 2010), http://www.c-span.org/video/?c2924010/clip-kagan-conﬁrmation-hearing
-day-2-part-1 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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ism,” and the Constitution’s “meaning does not change,” but when applying a “broadly worded” provision, “all you have is the principle and you
have to use your judgment to apply it.”9 But of course one can resist my terminology without resisting my substantive claims.
The substantive point is that this concept of originalism is a coherent
middle position. It rejects some more radical forms of originalism that
have an outsized voice in American legal culture; those forms of originalism must be justiﬁed through nonpositive analysis.10 It also stands in contrast to the widely repeated view that the practice of American constitutional law is pluralist. Pluralists argue that our practice is a set of competing methods, none of which dominates the others.11 Whereas those pluralist conceptions are ﬂat, under my view they are hierarchically structured, with originalism at the top of the hierarchy.12
If I’m right about all of this, originalist judging can potentially be
justiﬁed on a much more straightforward and plausible normative ground—
that judges have a duty to apply the law, and our current law, in this time
and place, is this form of originalism. That account might disappoint both
stricter originalists and nonoriginalists alike, but it should also reorient
their debates going forward. And even if I’m wrong about my positive account, milder versions of these normative conclusions nonetheless follow.
Originalism is still a legally privileged methodology, and originalist judging is likely still permissible. Either way, the positive turn helps move past
the current debates and justify a form of originalism that does not derive
from the dead hand.13
9. Matthew Walther, Sam Alito: A Civil Man, Am. Spectator (May 2014), http://
spectator.org/articles/58731/sam-alito-civil-man [http://perma.cc/79PM-JETQ].
10. See Joel Alicea, Originalism and the Rule of the Dead, 23 Nat’l Aff. 149, 161 (2015)
(expressing skepticism about something like inclusive originalism and submitting “[l]egal
conservatives . . . would do better to insist on the rule of the dead”).
11. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 155–62 (1991) [hereinafter Bobbitt,
Interpretation]; see also Ian C. Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities: Meditations on Bobbitt’s
Theory of the Constitution, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 157, 159 (2008) [hereinafter Bartrum,
Metaphors and Modalities] (rejecting “tempt[ation] to look outside the practice for a means
of resolution—perhaps by ranking the modes of argument”); Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional
Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 400 (2009) (“[A]rguments about what the
Constitution commands and prohibits have always looked to multiple sources of
authority . . . .”).
12. Richard Fallon has previously put forward a similar hierarchy, arguing that “the
implicit norms of our constitutional practice accord the foremost authority to arguments
from text, followed . . . by arguments concerning the framers’ intent,” Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
1189, 1193–94 (1987) [hereinafter Fallon, Constructivist Coherence Theory], but his
notion of hierarchy appears to be substantially weaker than mine. See id. at 1246 (denying
“higher ranked categories represent preferred starting points”).
13. A related jurisprudential turn in originalism has previously been proposed by
Mitchell Berman and Kevin Toh, who distinguish carefully between theories of “law” and
theories of “adjudication” and argue that “old originalism was (chiefly) a theory of adjudication, whereas new originalism is (chieﬂy) a theory of law.” Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin

2354

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:2349

Part I of this Essay brieﬂy explains different ways originalism might
relate to other forms of interpretation, and defends an inclusive variety
of originalism. Part II then begins the positive inquiry, providing evidence
from our higher-order and lower-order practices that point toward inclusive originalism. Part III explains how this positive inquiry can have normative implications. And Part IV shows how even if the positive argument
is only partly successful, other normative implications nonetheless follow.
I. UNDERSTANDING INCLUSIVE ORIGINALISM
This Part explains the concept of “inclusive” originalism. Section I.A
distinguishes originalist claims of several different strengths. Section I.B
explains what “inclusive” originalism includes and what it doesn’t and why
it’s a meaningful middle ground.
A.

Versions of Originalism

From a certain, straightforward point of view it may simply seem impossible to describe our current positive law as originalist. Certainly some
criticisms of originalism have this tone,14 and one can see why. If you were
describing American law to a Martian or a Finn, you might note that while
originalism is frequently invoked in Supreme Court opinions, it is not the
only thing that is invoked—and it is not even clear it is the most often invoked. And nearly every originalist has a long list of practices or precedents that he would describe as inconsistent with the original meaning of
the Constitution.15
But these ways of thinking about whether originalism is the law deﬁne originalism too narrowly. They reﬂect a widespread but mistaken assumption—that originalism must be either the exclusive criterion for constitutional law, or just one among many valid criteria. In fact there is an important middle possibility.

Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82
Fordham L. Rev. 545, 546 (2013) [hereinafter Berman & Toh, New Originalism]; see also
Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability
Problem, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1739, 1739 (2013) [hereinafter Berman & Toh, Combinability]
(distinguishing between “a position about what the law is or consists of” and “a position
about how judges should decide or adjudicate constitutional disputes”). I won’t adhere to
precisely the same framework and terminology, but I will similarly divide my inquiry into
the positive question of what constitutes our constitutional law and the normative question
of what judges ought to do.
14. See, e.g., Frank Cross, The Failed Promise of Originalism 134 (2011); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist
Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1107, 1129–32 (2008) [hereinafter Fallon, Hartian].
15. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv.
L. Rev. 1231, 1232–49 (1994) (arguing administrative state violates original meaning of
Constitution in multiple respects).
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To see it, consider these four possible relationships that originalism16
could have with American law:
(1)
The strongest position would be “exclusive originalism”—this
would be the idea that judges should look only to the original
meaning of the Constitution and apply that meaning to the
facts of a given dispute. All other sources of law, such as precedent or practice or policy, would be categorically forbidden.
(2)
A moderate position would be “inclusive originalism.”17 Under inclusive originalism, the original meaning of the
Constitution is the ultimate criterion for constitutional law,
including of the validity of other methods of interpretation
or decision. This means that judges can look to precedent,
policy, or practice, but only to the extent that the original meaning incorporates or permits them.18
(3)
A weak position would be a form of pluralism: Originalism is
part of the law. Under this position, originalism is a method
of decision, but not the only criterion for other methods of
decision. So judges may consider precedent instead of originalism in some cases, even if the original meaning would
not permit precedent. At the same time, there are at least some
cases where the original meaning applies on its own authority. Hence, (4), below, is rejected. (As we will see, there are
several variants of this position, with one important question
being whether there is a “meta-rule” that governs conﬂicts
between originalism and others sources of law.)19
(4)
The most anti-originalist position would be that originalism
is not at all a source of law. Those who want to apply the original meaning in any case are actually urging a change in the
law, and their project must be justiﬁed on that ground, if at all.
(One could also subdivide this position in many ways.)
16. This list is intended to be agnostic about various intramural disputes over what,
exactly, original meaning is. My own view, following that espoused by Stephen E. Sachs, is
that the original meaning is constructed by the original legal rules, and hence is “the
Founders’ law, including lawful changes.” Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of
Legal Change, 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 817, 819 (2015) [hereinafter Sachs, Change]. But
most of this Essay’s claims do not depend on that narrow point.
17. There is of course a sense in which this form of originalism also relies “exclusively” on originalism to pedigree a constitutional decision. But it is useful to distinguish the
two just as some within jurisprudence ﬁnd it useful to distinguish between “inclusive” and
“exclusive” legal positivism. See generally Kenneth Einar Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism,
in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 125 (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) [hereinafter Oxford Handbook]; Andrei Marmor, Exclusive
Legal Positivism, in Oxford Handbook, supra, at 104.
18. I say “incorporates” or “permits” to encompass two different ways originalism might
deal with other methods. See infra section I.B.
19. Interestingly, even many scholars who themselves criticize originalism concede that
(3) is true and originalism is part of the law. See sources cited infra notes 307–310.
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It is probably right that there is no way a positivist could subscribe to
(1), since it outright rejects sources of law that judges uncontroversially use
every day. And it is also true that possibility (3) seems weak enough that it
might be dismissed as trivial20 (though as I will discuss eventually,21 it is not
quite as weak of a claim as it seems).
But the big mistake is to assume that (1) and (3) are the only possibilities. In fact, the intermediate possibility (2) is distinct, plausible, and
important.
B.

Understanding the Plausibility of Inclusive Originalism

What exactly does it mean to suggest that originalism is the criterion
for other methods of interpretation? How would that work? Originalism
might incorporate other legal doctrines into itself, the same way that American
law might choose to incorporate a foreign legal rule or an economic standard.
Originalism might also simply permit a given actor to choose a rule governing some deﬁned issue, the same way that a court might be allowed to
choose rules governing its own proceedings. Indeed, while more work
should be done here, I will suggest that originalism is most plausibly understood as incorporating and permitting such doctrines.
1. Evolving Terms. — At a most basic level, it does not take any fancy
theoretical footwork to see that ﬁxed texts can harness what seem to be
changing meanings. Though the text may have originally been expected to
apply in a particular way to a particular circumstance, that does not mean
that its original meaning always must apply in the same way. Similarly, originalists can sensibly apply legal texts to circumstances unforeseeable at
the time of enactment. This is because a word can have a ﬁxed abstract
meaning even if the speciﬁc facts that meaning points to change over
time.22
The standard legal examples are the word “unreasonable” in the
Fourth Amendment23 or the words “cruel and unusual” in the Eighth.24
Even more obvious examples might be the reference to “property” in the

20. See Berman, Bunk, supra note 1, at 19–20 (noting many originalists are “not satisﬁed by a disposition on the part of interpreters to, shall we say, take original meanings and
principles ‘seriously,’ or pay them substantial regard”).
21. See infra Part IV (discussing implications of recognizing originalism as one part of
our law).
22. See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense–Reference Distinction, 50
St. Louis U. L.J. 555, 559–60 (2006) [hereinafter Green, Sense–Reference Distinction].
23. U.S. Const. amend. IV. But see Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 686–93 (1999) (arguing “unreasonable” had more
technical legal meaning than is usually recognized today).
24. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of
“Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1739,
1745 (2008) (“[T]he word ‘unusual’ was a term of art that referred to government practices that are contrary to ‘long usage’ or ‘immemorial usage.’”).
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Fifth Amendment,25 which can extend to new forms of property that did
not exist in 1791 (cars, not just carriages), or to “armies” in Article I, which
can include armies that have modern weaponry and vehicles (airplanes, not
just muskets).26
This is not to say that the Constitution’s text is inﬁnitely malleable. It
is deﬁnitely not.27 Rather, the degree of malleability is a question about each
particular word or clause at issue. As Chris Green puts it, “The choice of
language is a choice about what sorts of changes should make a difference to the set of future applications.”28 Similarly, David Strauss writes, “this
choice between generality and speciﬁcity is a crucial constitutional decision,” and originalists ought not impose greater speciﬁcity than the Framers
did.29 The point is simply that the Constitution’s terms may have signiﬁcantly more ﬂexibility than the simplest conception of originalism would
imply.
2. Devices for Resolving Ambiguity and Vagueness. — The Constitution’s
text is generally central to originalism. At the same time, texts can be ambiguous or vague and that ambiguity or vagueness must be resolved.30
Originalists then turn to devices like “construction” (a much-debated accessory to interpretation),31 “liquidation” (a method of resolving ambiguity or vagueness through past practice),32 and presumptions (like the

25. U.S. Const. amend. V.
26. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
27. See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning
Fallacy, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 737, 739 [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Abstract
Meaning] (arguing seemingly abstract provisions may not turn out to be abstract upon
further investigation).
28. Green, Sense–Reference Distinction, supra note 22, at 583.
29. David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112
Yale L.J. 1717, 1736–37 (2003) [hereinafter Strauss, Jefferson].
30. On the distinction between ambiguity and vagueness, see Lawrence B. Solum,
The Interpretation–Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95, 97–98 (2010)
[hereinafter Solum, Interpretation–Construction]. As Solum notes, many people do not
use the terms in their precise senses.
31. See Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution 120–31 (2d ed. 2014); Keith
Whittington, Constitutional Constructions: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 3–
9 (1999); Solum, Interpretation–Construction, supra note 30; Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 453, 455–56 (2013)
[hereinafter Solum, Constitutional Construction].
32. See William Baude, Sharing the Necessary and Proper Clause, 128 Harv. L. Rev.
Forum 39, 48 (2014), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
vol128_Baude.pdf [http://perma.cc/J7ML-4XCG] (“Liquidation (think ‘liquidated damages’) was a term for settling the meaning of a contested or vague legal provision through
practice.”); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L.
Rev. 1, 10–21 (2001) [hereinafter Nelson, Stare Decisis] (similar).
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presumption of constitutionality).33 So long as these devices are themselves permitted by many versions of originalism.
Some originalists, most prominently Rappaport and McGinnis, resist
“construction,” and other “sources of law extrinsic to the Constitution”
as being inconsistent with originalism.34 For present purposes this disagreement is beside the point: Rappaport and McGinnis agree that originalism permits devices for resolving ambiguity and vagueness. They argue
that the devices most consistent with originalism are the “original methods,”—i.e., “the interpretive methods that the enactors would have deemed
applicable to the constitution.”35 If, for example, liquidation through practice
or a presumption of constitutionality were originally permitted, then their
continued use today does not create a conﬂict between positive law and
originalism.
A different originalist vision treats such devices as a background rule
of law—one that is not in the text itself but is still used to discern its legal
effect.36 If these background rules have a legal pedigree to the Founding,
then they too are consistent with inclusive originalism.37
A full catalog of the appropriate devices is probably a book-length
project, and there may be plenty of disagreement about what methods
are permissible for resolving constitutional ambiguity and vagueness. All
sorts of approaches are attributed to the Founding,38 and resolving them
will require doing the historical and interpretive work. For present purposes, the point is once again that originalism supports at least some methods that do not look, superﬁcially, like originalism. What is important is
not whether or not constitutional interpreters always look exclusively at
the original meaning, but whether they look at those things in cases where
the original meaning would say not to.
3. Precedent. — Finally, originalist reasoning permits a doctrine of
precedent, or stare decisis. There are a few notable originalists who disa-

33. See Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 411, 421–28 (1996) (explaining how burdens of proof operate as presumptions that
resolve indeterminacy).
34. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution
142–43 (2013) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Good Constitution].
35. Id. at 82.
36. See Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 1797, 1803–10 [hereinafter Sachs, Unwritten Law] (describing “interpretive
rules” that are “outside the written text”).
37. For more on such rules, and an argument that they are inevitable, see William Baude
& Stephen Sachs, The Law of Interpretation (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
38. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Reply to Diane Wood, Constitutions and Capabilities:
A (Necessarily) Pragmatic Approach, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 431, 431–36 (2010) (describing
“[c]apabilities [a]pproach” that arguably “shaped the public meaning of key elements of
the text” at Founding).
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gree, claiming that the Constitution itself mostly forbids such a doctrine.39
But most originalists do not think so. Indeed, they have a wide variety of
theories reconciling precedent and originalism. Some hold that originalism permits rules of precedent as a form of common law;40 some suggest
that precedent is permissible so long as it is not clearly erroneous;41 some
argue that precedent is permissible because it was a rule of common law
at the Founding,42 or supports the same values as originalism.43
This point is crucial to the positive turn, but it has been so well-covered
by so many scholars that I will recapitulate it only brieﬂy. The key is that
the textualist case against stare decisis is too quick. Article III empowers
judges to decide cases and implicitly requires them to follow the law in doing so, while Article VI conﬁrms that the Constitution is a form of binding and supreme law. But an originalist must understand these provisions, as they were originally read, in the context of the common law.44
An obvious and uncontroversial example of such a common-law rule
is waiver. A judge is not required to adjudicate a constitutional claim if a
39. See Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited,
5 Ave Maria L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2007) [hereinafter Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional] (arguing
Court should “mostly never” “choose precedent over direct examination of constitutional
meaning” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically
Corrupting Inﬂuence of Precedent, 22 Const. Comment. 289, 289 (2005) [hereinafter
Paulsen, Corrupting Influence] (“Stare decisis contradicts the premise of originalism . . . .”).
40. See John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke
L.J. 503, 525–31 (2000) (“There is good reason to believe that most of what we know as
the law of precedent in federal court is general law . . . .”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 803, 828 (2009)
[hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Precedent] (“[G]iven the absence of an alternative
source of law and its conformity with the history, the argument for treating precedent as a
matter of common law is compelling.”).
41. See Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 32, at 83–84.
42. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1813,
1863–66 (2012) [hereinafter Sachs, Backdrops] (“Stare decisis might simply be a recognized common law doctrine . . . . Having (allegedly) been in effect at the time of the
Founding, . . . it therefore continues to be in effect today.”).
43. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 159 (1990) (“[T]hose who adhere
to a philosophy of original understanding are more likely to respect precedent than those
who do not.”); Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 Vand. L.
Rev. 105, 108–09 (2015) (“Asking judges to defer to the pronouncements of their predecessors can be a useful mechanism of judicial constraint, which is a value that many originalists have long prized.”); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare
Decisis, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1437, 1473–77 (2007) (arguing stare decisis supports principles of
popular sovereignty).
44. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Precedent, supra note 40, at 823–29 (“There are
strong reasons for concluding that the Framers’ generation would have understood the judicial power [in Article III] to include the minimal concept of precedent . . . .”); Sachs,
Backdrops, supra note 42, at 1865 (noting precedent was “one of the well-understood
background assumptions of the common law” at time Framers were drafting (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by
Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J.
1535, 1577 (2000))).
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party has not raised it. This is not because rules of waiver trump the
Constitution, but rather because the Constitution itself asks judges to decide cases in the original way—subject to certain well-established commonlaw principles.45
To an originalist, precedent can operate the same way. Precedent, like
waiver, was a well-established common-law-doctrine at the time of the
Founding.46 Hence the original meaning of Articles III and VI allows
judges to apply precedent. As with waiver, that is true even though applying precedent will sometimes lead judges away from what might seem like
the purest originalist outcome in a given case. A party whose originalist
claim is foreclosed by a valid waiver rule or a valid rule of precedent will
lose; but that is because inclusive originalism permits rules of waiver and
precedent.
Similarly, deciding cases on the basis of precedent does not conﬂict
with Article V by creating some sort of unauthorized constitutional amendment.47 In form, relying on precedent to decide a case instead of ﬁrstorder legal materials is no different than relying on a previous judgment
and the law of res judicata instead of ﬁrst-order legal materials. If one
accepts the binding force of judgments as consistent with the original
Constitution (as one should),48 then one should be open to historical arguments that precedent is required or permitted as well.49
I have described inclusive originalism as both “requiring” and “permitting” these other methods of interpretation and decision. That is because sometimes originalism will point to one right method, and other times
it will allow some decisionmaker to use one of several methods. A method like the use of evolving language is likely an example of a submethod
that is required by originalism. Giving evolving terms their intended evolving meaning is necessary to be faithful to their original sense. By contrast, methods like precedent and waiver are probably better described as
permitted. Because of their common-law scope and status, judges have a
certain amount of discretion both in articulating the rules and in deciding whether to apply them in a particular case. The exact breadth of that

45. See Sachs, Unwritten Law, supra note 36, at 1819–21 (“[O]ur legal language is
what logicians call ‘defeasible’: we ordinarily state legal rules subject to unnamed exceptions that defeat their operation in particular cases.”).
46. McGinnis & Rappaport, Precedent, supra note 40, at 813–23 (enumerating many
pieces of evidence establishing acceptance of doctrine of precedent at time of Founding);
Sachs, Unwritten Law, supra note 36, at 1832 (discussing common law practice of stare
decisis).
47. Thanks to Larry Alexander for this challenge.
48. See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 Geo. L.J. 1807, 1809 (2008) [hereinafter Baude, Judgment Power] (“[T]he judicial power is the power to issue binding
judgments.”).
49. McGinnis & Rappaport, Precedent, supra note 40, at 829 (making this analogy).
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discretion is a fair question,50 but for present purposes it is enough to see
that inclusive originalism authorizes and bounds such doctrines.
Because originalism permits a doctrine of precedent, many of its
most obvious conﬂicts with modern practice go away. Richard Fallon points
to paper money and social security as examples of widely accepted practices that (he says) have questionable originalist pedigrees.51 They are
“constitutionally valid today because they are recognized as such under
what H.L.A. Hart classically described as practice-based ‘rules of recognition’ for determining constitutional validity, and they would remain valid
even if it could be established decisively that they are incompatible with
the original understanding.”52
But paper money and social security have been upheld by the Supreme
Court.53 If originalism permits precedent to control those questions, then
our current regime may be consistent with originalism even if an originalist would not have decided those precedents in the ﬁrst place. It is not
necessarily unoriginalist to adhere to an unoriginalist precedent. It would
be different if the Court issued openly nonoriginalist opinions that were
widely accepted “not merely as ﬁnal, but as properly rendered.”54 Fallon
appears to believe that this is the case. As I will discuss, I am not convinced that it is.55
4. Is This Really a Kind of Originalism? — To some readers, the above
conception of originalism may seem like cheating. The implicit theory
behind this criticism is that true originalism is “exclusive” originalism, not
merely “inclusive” originalism.56 Some would say that once originalism accommodates precedent and ﬂexible language, it has lost its distinctive meaning.57 But even if this is a dispute over labels, there are good reasons that
the label “originalism” is apt.

50. My instincts lie close to the view implied in Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 32, but
the matter deserves further study and may be examined somewhat in Baude & Sachs, supra
note 37.
51. Fallon, Hartian, supra note 14, at 1113.
52. Id. (footnote omitted).
53. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 634 (1937) (upholding payment of social security “Old Age Beneﬁts”); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 529 (1870) (upholding law making paper money “legal tender”).
54. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 535,
548 (1999).
55. See infra section II.B.2.
56. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 14, at 133–34.
57. See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Geo. L.J. 713, 715,
744–64 (2011) (claiming by accommodating precedent and flexibility “originalism has sacrificed . . . the very thing that made it what it is”); James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now?
I Hope Not!, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1785, 1788–94 (2013) (arguing new originalism lacks “one
uniﬁed view”); Karlan, supra note 11, at 400–01 (“Originalism has become a blanket term
describing constitutional interpretation, rather than a distinctive form of a generic
practice.”).
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The ﬁrst reason is that it’s a label used by originalists. Prominent originalist scholars disagree about a lot, but a lot of them in fact agree on
the use of precedent and other methods of decision that have an originalist pedigree. This kind of inclusive originalism is potentially consistent
with a range of approaches from McGinnis’s and Rappaport’s “original
methods” approach58 to Jack Balkin’s “living originalism”59 to Bernadette
Meyler’s “common-law originalism.”60 It is consistent with Lawrence Solum’s
observation that originalism is a family of theories united by principles of
ﬁxation and constraint.61 Even critics of originalism such as Paul Brest62
and Mitch Berman63 have accepted this kind of inclusive framework as a
kind of originalism. To be sure, it may well be that some conceptions of
originalism in politics or in the popular press do not always accept these
distinctions,64 but those more radical theories may not be embraced by
the positive turn.
Second, this kind of nonexclusive originalism makes sense and captures the animating justiﬁcations for originalism. Remember, the point in
each case is that the choices embodied in the original meaning are authoritative. So to the extent that the original Constitution unambiguously
foreclosed the use of precedent65 or any other source, that choice would
be authoritative. (Notice that even the most ardent believers in precedent do not think that constitutional precedents should trump subsequent constitutional amendments that overrule them—as the Eleventh
Amendment overruled Chisholm v. Georgia,66 as the Fourteenth Amendment
overruled Dred Scott v. Sanford,67 as the Sixteenth Amendment overruled
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,68 and as the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
overruled Oregon v. Mitchell.69)
58. McGinnis & Rappaport, Good Constitution, supra note 34, at 139–43.
59. Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2011) [hereinafter Balkin, Living].
60. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 551,
593–600 (2006).
61. Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 31; Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1935, 1942–43.
62. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
Rev. 204, 223, 231–34 (1980) (discussing “moderate originalism”).
63. See Berman, Bunk, supra note 1, at 10, 20, 22, 29–31 (describing as “modest variant of strong originalism” that “interpreters must accord original meaning . . . lexical priority when interpreting the Constitution”).
64. See Colby, supra note 57, at 776–78 (decrying popular conception of originalism).
65. As for instance, it would, if one accepted the arguments made by Lawson, Mostly
Unconstitutional, supra note 39, or Paulsen, Corrupting Inﬂuence, supra note 39.
66. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
67. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
68. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
69. 400 U.S. 112 (1970); see Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court
Precedent, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 991, 993 & n.7 (1987) (acknowledging legitimacy of overruling
these decisions by amendment); see also Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as
a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 Notre Dame. L. Rev 2253, 2277 (2014) [hereinafter Sachs,
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At the same time, the decision not to eliminate all discretion is also a
choice that an originalist must respect. The decision to use language that
encompasses changing circumstances, the decision to incorporate or permit precedent, and the decision to use vague language subject to existing
law for resolving vagueness are all originalist decisions, and rejecting them
would be odd. “Why be more ‘originalist’ than the Founders, or more
Catholic than the Pope?”70
Just as one is a textualist by looking to a law’s purpose if it is directly
placed in the text; just as one obeys federal law even if it incorporates
state law; one is an originalist by using whatever kinds of authority the
original meaning permits. This form of inclusive originalism simply requires all other modalities to trace their pedigree to the original meaning.
Finally, this kind of inclusive originalism is meaningfully distinct from
nonoriginalist competitors. Unlike pluralist theories in which different methodologies compete and have their own source of authority, inclusive originalism has one methodology that rules them all. That hierarchy keeps
originalism from being inﬁnitely capacious and means that other methods are always subject, in principle, to historical falsiﬁcation.
Having understood the basic idea of inclusive originalism, let’s now
turn to the heart of the positive inquiry. Is this moderate form of originalism our law?
II. THE POSITIVE INQUIRY
A long time ago, the Constitution was enacted as the self-proclaimed
“supreme Law of the Land.”71 We all know that. At the same time, we also
know two other things: One is that no document can make itself supreme
law just by saying so. After all, the Articles of Confederation also purport
to be binding law.72 For that matter, so does the Confederate Constitution.73
On their own terms, all three documents purport to govern a state like South
Carolina, so it cannot be the documents themselves that decide which one
governs.74
Constitution-in-Exile] (wondering what would happen to Brown v. Board of Education if Fourteenth
Amendment were repealed).
70. Sachs, supra note 16, at 821; see also Stephen G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 483, 503 (2014) (“The Constitution
uses rules when it means to use rules, and it uses standards when it means to use
standards . . . . To discover the meaning of the Constitution, one cannot start with a
presumption in favor of one or the other . . . .”).
71. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
72. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. XIII, para. 1 (“And the Articles of this
confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State . . . .”).
73. Const. of the Confederate States of 1861, art. VI, cl. 3 (“This Constitution . . .
shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .”).
74. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional
Norms, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 45, 52 (1994) [hereinafter Schauer, Necessary
Externality] (making similar point about legal status of document he drew up and stuck in
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The second thing is that whatever one thinks of the initial proclaiming, a lot has happened since then. There have been formal amendments, of course, but also other changes in how judges and other people
think about constitutional requirements.
Some scholars claim that those changes are unwritten amendments,
which mean that the textual Constitution is no longer the true Constitution
of the current United States.75 Those unwritten amendments might not
comply with Article V, but so what? If they became law on their own, they
could trump Article V, just as the Constitution could trump the Articles of
Confederation, and just as the Articles could trump British law.76 And
even those who would not go so far as to say that document itself has
been superseded might say that our legal rules for understanding that document have been superseded.77 (The original rules are originalist by deﬁnition.78) That is a different form of unwritten amendment. As Reva Siegel
has put it:
The living have not assented to Article V as the sole method of
constitutional change. And if we are to construe the living as having implicitly consented to any constitutional understanding or
arrangement, it is to the Constitution as it is currently interpreted, with its many pathways of change.79
This is where the positive inquiry kicks in. To ask whether the written Constitution and the original interpretive rules are the law today is to
ask a question about modern social facts. There are different jurisprudenhis pocket); see also Frederick Schauer, The Force of Law 79 (2015) [hereinafter Schauer,
Force] (repeating this example).
75. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 92 (1998) (“I accept th[e]
challenge [of legal positivism].”); David A. Strauss, The Neo-Hamiltonian Temptation, 123
Yale L.J. 2676, 2680 (2014) [hereinafter Strauss, Neo-Hamiltonian] (“Ackerman, to his
credit, does not accept Hamilton’s suggestion that the will of the People is embedded in
the written Constitution alone. We the People have other ways of changing the Constitution.”);
see also Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response
to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 Drake L. Rev. 925, 930–32 (2007) (citing more than
dozen other sources); David A. Strauss, We the People, They the People, and the Puzzle of
Democratic Constitutionalism, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1969, 1981 (2013) (stating “Constitution we
actually have” is “an evolutionary one, not one that is under glass”).
76. Fred Schauer also gives the example of the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of
Independence trumping British law. Schauer, Force, supra note 74, at 79–80.
77. See Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness, 53 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 1115, 1117–18 (2012) [hereinafter Adler, Contestation] (suggesting there
is consensus on text but not interpretive method); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments
and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 644 (2008) [hereinafter Samaha,
Dead Hand Arguments] (same). On the general idea of interpretive rules as law, see Baude
& Sachs, supra note 37.
78. See John Harrison, On the Hypotheses that Lie at the Foundations of Originalism,
31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 473, 474 (2008) (“[Immediately after the Founding,] every interpreter’s methodology, whatever it was, had to be ‘originalist,’ because the origin had been
so recent.”).
79. Reva B. Siegel, Heller and Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56
UCLA L. Rev. 1399, 1405 (2009).
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tial formulations for making this inquiry and this Essay won’t attempt to
resolve the questions of technical jurisprudence.80 Instead, it will make a preliminary effort to show our constitutional practice can and should be understood as originalist.
This is ultimately an empirical question, of a sort. But because it is a
question about a complicated custom, it is very difficult to answer it simply by coding cases and measuring their outcomes, or surveying a group of
people.81 Our legal practices involve recourse both to high levels of abstraction and to more speciﬁc reasoning necessary to resolve particular
cases.
This Part canvasses these two different aspects of American legal
practice—higher-order practices that operate at a fairly high level of abstraction, such as widespread conventions about the Framers, and lowerorder practices, specifically how the Supreme Court publicly reasons about
constitutional law. I suggest that these practices, understood together,
point toward inclusive originalism.
A.

Higher-Order Practices

Some positive evidence for originalism lies in our higher-order practices—namely the attribution of authority to the Framers, the lack of any
acknowledged rupture in the legal order, and the continued usage of the
institutions created by the original Constitution. I doubt that these higherorder practices will prove decisive by themselves, but they help to set the
stage for understanding our lower-order practices, so I will canvas them
quickly before moving on.
1. The Framers’ Authority. — Some originalists might pursue an argument that the Constitution’s status derives from our basic convention of
80. Three important versions of legal positivism are those espoused by Hart, Joseph
Raz, and Scott Shapiro. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3d ed. 2012); Joseph Raz, The
Authority of Law 237 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Raz, Authority]; Joseph Raz, Between
Authority and Interpretation (2009); Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (2011). Hart will sometimes
make appearances in the footnotes here because his work is more frequently invoked in
the relevant legal scholarship. Accord Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 140 n.361
(U. of Ill. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Res. Papers Series, No. 07-24, 2008), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1120244 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Solum, Semantic]
(similar observation); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1805–06, 1848 (2005) (following Hart’s framework). But none of this
should be taken to be an assertion in technical jurisprudence, just a lawyer’s operating assumption. See Solum, Semantic, supra, at 140 n.361 (expressing “agnostic[ism] as between Hart’s theory and its most contemporary rivals”).
81. On the question of who one would survey, see Hart, supra note 80, at 101–03;
infra notes 224–227 and accompanying text. For survey efforts, see generally Donald L.
Drakeman, What’s the Point of Originalism?, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1123, 1133–38
(2013); Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Proﬁling Originalism,
111 Colum. L. Rev. 356, 362–70 (2011). An experimental study is Kathryn Bi, Lay Judgments
of Constitutional Interpretation 15–23 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).

2366

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:2349

revering the Framers82: First, they would say, it is simply empirically obvious that the U.S. Constitution is accepted as law today in the United States.83
(That dispenses with the hypotheticals about the Articles of Confederation,
the Confederate Constitution, and the contents of Fred Schauer’s pocket.)
Second, it is empirically true, if slightly less obvious, that the Constitution
is accepted in a particular way. We accept it as a legal command enacted
by people in authority hundreds of years ago, made law through the process of ratiﬁcation (and later amended). That is why we call certain people of 1787–1789 the “Framers” and “Ratiﬁers”—because they are the
ones who made it law. Indeed the Constitution itself contains both a date
and old signatures on it, which we honor as part of the current text.
Once the Constitution is understood as an old and binding legal text,
that helps ground its old meaning.84
Of course subsequent amendments—or at least amendments after
the ﬁrst twelve—have only an indirect connection to the Framers. But
they all purport to be enacted pursuant to the formal process of Article
V, which is itself the work of the Framers and Ratiﬁers. One could thus
see even the subsequent amendments, if properly enacted, as indirectly
pedigreed to the Framers.85 Similarly, a claim that the subsequent amendments did not comply with Article V would be a threat to orthodox originalism.86 Alternatively, those who substantially revere the Framers might
think that subsequent amendments should be narrowly construed, though
few originalists today explicitly so argue.87
Hence, recognition of the Framers’ authority might support a legal
principle of originalism. While legal theorists have claimed for a long time
that nobody has authority just “because I said so,”88 and all the more so when
that body is long dead, it’s still plausible that our current legal practice is
to treat the dead as if they had legal authority.
Versions of this argument may be the most sympathetic way to understand what Jamal Greene has called “ethical arguments” for original82. Again, to the extent this view turns on popular rather than official views, it cannot
be traced to Hart’s technical jurisprudence, supra note 81, but I suspect that it has sufficient purchase for some that it is worth discussing here.
83. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment
on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1435, 1454 (1997).
84. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming the Constitution, 91 Geo. L.J. 407, 436 (2003)
(reviewing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution (2001)) (discussing this
intuition).
85. See Sachs, Change, supra note 16, at 839, 845 (noting Article V amendments are
consistent with the Founders’ rule of change).
86. See Ackerman, supra note 75, at 99–115 (discussing implications of Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments’ putative noncompliance with Article V); see also Sachs, Change,
supra note 16, at 854–55 (acknowledging threat).
87. See generally Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 Md. L. Rev.
978, 1014 (2012) (arguing originalists neglect Fourteenth Amendment and attributing this
to “cultural affinity” announced by originalism).
88. E.g., Laurence Claus, Law’s Evolution and Human Understanding 29–37 (2012).
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ism. Greene notes that there is a speciﬁcally American practice of reverence for the constitutional Framers89 and that the “Constitution is a
source of political identity for many Americans, and as a symbol of
American sovereignty it is a potent reference for narratives of both restoration and redemption.”90 And while Greene himself is skeptical of originalism, he suggests that to the extent that originalist arguments hold
sway in America, it is because they construct a narrative connecting our
current social facts to the founding era.91
2. No Revolutions. — An alternative, abstract formulation is put forward by Stephen Sachs. Originalism, Sachs argues, can be recast as an
account of lawful change:
What originalism requires of legal change is that it be, well, legal ; that it be lawful, that it be done according to law . . . . The
originalist claim is that each change in our law since the Founding
needs a justiﬁcation framed in legal terms, and not just social or
political ones. To put it another way, originalists believe that the
American legal system hasn’t yet departed (even a little bit) from
the Founders’ law in the way that the colonies threw off the British
yoke or the states got rid of the Articles of Confederation.92
Essentially, Sachs argues that originalism is our law if there have been
no revolutions in the law since the Founding.93
Sachs argues that this belief is “[t]he ofﬁcial story of American law” and
“reﬂected in the attitudes of lawyers and academics.”94 As he puts it, “[I]f
you go into court in a constitutional case and say, ‘well, Judge, the original Constitution is against us, but we superseded it through an informal
amendment in 1937,’ you will lose.”95 That is ultimately a positive claim
about our lower-order practices, which I will examine shortly.
3. Basic Structures. — Who is the President? Who is in Congress?
Who is on the Supreme Court? These are some of the foundational questions of constitutional law, and yet there is nearly universal agreement about
how to answer them. That suggests that our constitutional system has at least
some easy cases in which we are capable of reaching widespread legal
agreement.
These easy cases are not resolved on policy grounds, or even on intuitive unwritten notions of legitimacy. They are instead decided on the ba-

89. Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 63–71 (2009)
[hereinafter Greene, Origins].
90. Id. at 81 (emphasis omitted).
91. Id. at 82–88.
92. Sachs, Change, supra note 16, at 820–21.
93. Id. at 844–45 (“[F]rom the Founding on, [originalism] requires that changes be
lawful . . . .”).
94. Id. at 870.
95. Id. at 871.
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sis of the constitutional text.96 The President is the person who is picked
by the electoral college, whose members are picked by the states.97 And despite some grousing, that result is widely accepted even when somebody
else wins the popular vote.98 Even the deeply controversial decision in
Bush v. Gore did not concern a challenge to the text’s electoral college,
but rather the lawful method for picking those electors and the Court’s
role in adjudicating it.99
Similarly, Congress and the Supreme Court are both selected according to the constitutional process. While people regularly suggest that either process needs reform, nobody suggests that the superior process is
thereby the law despite its deviation from the text.
One might suggest that the easy cases are decided by contemporary
practice, not by the text or its original meaning. On this account it is
something of a coincidence that our current practice for deciding who is
the President, or when he or she must stand for election, is the one originally prescribed. But it seems unlikely that practice is the best account.
Using the Presidency again as an example, by 2000, the electoral college
had not picked a popular-vote loser for President since 1888, so it was not
contemporary practice that told us that the electoral vote trumps the
popular vote. On the other side, by the 1930s there was a very longstanding practice limiting Presidents to two four-year terms.100 But when Franklin
Roosevelt sought and received a third term, it was not received as the kind
of constitutional violation that it would be if Ronald Reagan or Bill Clinton
had done so after the enactment of the Twenty-Second Amendment.
More plausibly, one might suggest, as David Strauss has, that the text
governs in these cases because it acts as “a focal point” whose answer is
normatively “acceptable.”101 Yet as Strauss acknowledges, the reason that
it is the text’s answer, rather than some other proposal, that serves as the
focal point is bound up with “the Constitution’s cultural salience.”102 The
96. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Our Anchor for 225 Years and Counting: The Enduring
Signiﬁcance of the Precise Text of the Constitution, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1907, 1913–14
(2014) (“The precise text of the Constitution controls our structure, and we do not ignore
the text of the Constitution simply because it was ratiﬁed 225 years ago, or may be outdated, or has not adapted to modern conditions.”).
97. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
98. Presidents John Quincy Adams, Rutherford Hayes, Benjamin Harrison, and
George W. Bush all had lower popular-vote totals than their competitors. Robert A. Dahl,
How Democratic Is the American Constitution? 79–80 (2001).
99. 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (invalidating recount ordered by Florida Supreme
Court).
100. See Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in
the United States, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1847, 1855–57 (discussing “tradition of the two-term
presidency”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 433–35
(2005) (noting ambiguities in this tradition).
101. Strauss, Jefferson, supra note 29, at 1733. For sophisticated and elaborate discussion, see Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy 88–114 (1999).
102. Strauss, Jefferson, supra note 29, at 1734.
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positivist extension of that insight would be that the Constitution’s cultural salience is, speciﬁcally, a widespread practice of treating the Constitution
as law.
Questions like this—and many others about basic structure—are
what Fred Schauer calls the “Easy Cases.”103 And while it is not obvious
that we can extend them to the “hard cases,” Schauer argues that we can.
The easy cases indicate the priority of the text in limiting when other
methods can be employed:
The language of the text, therefore, remains perhaps the most
signiﬁcant factor in setting the size of the frame . . . . An interpretation is legitimate (which is not the same as correct) only
insofar as it purports to interpret some language of the document, and only insofar as the interpretation is within the boundaries at least suggested by that language.104
To be sure, these observations about the basic structure might only
establish the priority of the constitutional text, and not necessarily its original meaning.105 After all, the meaning of many of the words in the electoral provisions of the Constitution may not have changed since 1787. Yet
even establishing that priority is an important point given the many legal
theories that rely on nontextual theories of constitutional law.
4. The Problem of Abstraction. — It may seem fruitless to try to derive
any sort of concrete claim about what the law is from social facts as thin
or abstract as the ones above. Matthew Adler, for instance, has expressed
skepticism about the use of “some vacuous criterion like ‘consistent with
the U.S. Constitution,’” demanding instead “a genuine, meaningful standard that could actually furnish a right answer to [an interpretive] dispute.”106 A related version of this objection has sometimes been framed as
the problem of “theoretical disagreement.”107
Yet a certain amount of reasoning from abstraction is common in legal
interpretation. For example, it is frequently the case that lawyers disagree
about what the law requires—whether a given kind of behavior is criminal, what principles determine how it should be punished, or whether a
particular official is authorized. But it is also frequently the case that even
while lawyers disagree about what the law requires in these situations,

103. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 431 (1985).
104. Id. at 430–31.
105. Hardin, for example, suggests that the original “intentions” of the Framers rapidly became obsolete, Hardin, supra note 101, at 112, though it is less clear what he thinks
of original meaning or inclusive originalism. Cf. id at 113 (quoting Madison on
“liquidation”).
106. Adler, Contestation, supra note 77, at 1131.
107. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 4–6 (1986). For explication and critique, see generally
Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1215 (2009)
[hereinafter Leiter, Explaining].
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they might agree that the way to ﬁgure out who is right is to read the U.S.
Code.108
Similarly, a seemingly theoretical disagreement can be illusory if both
parties agree about the ultimate grounds for resolving their disagreement.109 This means that legal convention must be taken as we ﬁnd it. If
our legal conventions converge on concrete and speciﬁc practices, there
will be less disagreement than if they are abstract, but that does not mean
that we cannot have abstract legal conventions. But there is force to Adler’s
point. If the positive turn is going to advance the conversation, it will likely do so because of our lower-order, more concrete practices.
B.

Lower-Order Practices (What the Court Says)

One key way of understanding our collective legal commitments in
concrete terms is by examining the practice of our courts. Indeed, the
practice of our courts is often marshaled as one of the key positive challenges to originalism.
I will look to the Supreme Court in particular. Why? The practice of
lower-court judges is generally neutral as to the relevant disputes. Nonexclusive originalists, like nearly everybody else, generally accept that lower
courts should rely on higher-court precedents rather than reasoning from
ﬁrst principles, and that is indeed what lower courts generally do. In other words, there is a shared consensus under almost every theory (including originalism) that lower courts are bound by “vertical precedent,” so
almost all the data points are uninformative. But competing theories do
disagree about how the Supreme Court ought to decide cases, making it
a useful place to look.
To be clear, I don’t mean to insist that a complete inquiry should be
limited solely to looking at what the Supreme Court says—at a minimum
one would need to know whether and why courts have such legal status.
So it may ultimately be important to look to official practice beyond judges.110
But the Supreme Court’s practice is a readily available source of evidence
of official attitudes, it is often thought to be inconsistent with originalism,
and it is an important place to start.111
108. See generally Sachs, Constitution-in-Exile, supra note 69, at 2263 (“Government
officers don’t all share an actual knowledge of the law, but rather a broad consensus—like
that held by ordinary citizens—about where they should look or whom they should ask.”).
For an analogous argument from the natural law perspective, see Allan Beever, The Declaratory
Theory of Law, 33 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 421, 428–29 (2013).
109. See Leiter, Explaining, supra note 107, at 1236–38 (arguing Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), invoked by Dworkin, supra note 107, at 21–23, does
not really contain theoretical disagreement).
110. See Leslie Green, Notes to the Third Edition, in Hart, supra note 80, at 309, 317
[hereinafter Green, Notes to the Third Edition] (discussing whether judges have special
role, compared to other officials, in constituting rule of recognition).
111. The importance of the Court in such positive inquiries has been recognized by
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Precedent-Based Constitutional Adjudication, Acceptance, and the
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My examination of currently established Supreme Court doctrine
yields at least two observations. First, in cases where the Court acknowledges a conﬂict between original meaning or textual meaning and another source of constitutional meaning, the text and original meaning prevail. Second, across the larger run of cases that do not feature an explicit
clash of methodologies, the Court never contradicts originalism. Indeed,
the canonical cases that are most frequently invoked as examples of antioriginalism are actually reconcilable with originalism.
The point of looking at these cases is not to ask whether the
Supreme Court’s decisions are correct as a matter of original meaning. It
is implausible that every single Supreme Court decision is correct under
anybody’s theory of constitutional meaning. And even if by some miracle,
all of the decisions did match one theory, that would surely be temporary.112 Rather, the point is to look to how the Supreme Court justiﬁes its
rulings, as evidence of what counts as a legally sufficient justiﬁcation in
our current system of constitutional law.
For the same reason, the cases that are the most important challenge
to originalism’s legal status are those cases that are currently important,
uncontested, and/or broadly accepted. After all, the relevant inquiry is
not so much whether, as a descriptive matter, the Supreme Court has always been doing originalism without knowing it;113 the question is whether our current legal commitments, which might be embodied in certain
Supreme Court cases, undermine the ultimate authority of originalism.
And as Sachs writes: “This argument doesn’t pose a conceptual problem,
but an empirical one; it depends on how many ‘ﬁxed star[s] in our constitutional constellation’ we actually have.”114
Or in Hart’s words:
Up to a certain point, the fact that some rulings given by a
scorer are plainly wrong is not inconsistent with the game continuing: they count as much as rulings which are obviously correct; but there is a limit to the extent to which tolerance of
incorrect decisions is compatible with the continued existence of
the same game, and this has an important legal analogue. The
fact that isolated or exceptional official aberrations are tolerated does not mean that the game of cricket or baseball is no
longer being played. On the other hand, if these aberrations are
frequent, or if the scorer repudiates the scoring rule, there must

Rule of Recognition, in The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution 47, 60 (Matthew
D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009).
112. See Sachs, Constitution-in-Exile, supra note 69, at 2256 (“Because history proceeds at its own pace . . . any constitution worth its salt may spend a good bit of time in
exile.”).
113. On why it need not be “always,” see infra section II.C.2.
114. Sachs, Constitution-in-Exile, supra note 69, at 2277 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
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come a point when either the players no longer accept the scorer’s aberrant rulings or, if they do, the game has changed.115
So has the Supreme Court repudiated the scoring rule or produced frequent aberrations? I will suggest not.
1. Originalism’s Priority. — Let us ﬁrst consider how the Court handles what it perceives as direct conﬂicts between different sources of constitutional law, starting with the very recent decision in NLRB v. Noel
Canning,116 about the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause.117
Noel Canning demonstrates the shared interpretive principles that may
underlie even seemingly deep methodological division.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, invalidated the appointments only because of the Senate’s pro forma sessions, to which the
Court gives some deference. The majority could have stopped there, but
they did not, instead choosing to resolve the much broader questions
that had split the lower courts—what counts as a “recess” under the
clause, and when does a vacancy “happen”? On both questions, the majority gave the executive branch a big victory, endorsing modern practice
despite arguments from text, structure, and original meaning. Meanwhile, the concurring opinion, written by Justice Scalia, is in substance a
dissent with respect to the broader questions. Justice Scalia announced
the opinion from the bench, as Justices usually do with strong dissents,
and the members of the concurrence did not join a single word of the
majority opinion. (In his other concurring opinion that day Scalia wrote:
“I prefer not to take part in the assembling of an apparent but specious
unanimity.”118)
Parts of Noel Canning read like a contentious victory of pragmatism
over originalism. Justice Breyer noted that his view of the clause “is reinforced by centuries of history, which we are hesitant to disturb” and that
“Justice Scalia would render illegitimate thousands of recess appointments reaching all the way back to the founding era.”119 He concludes:
“[W]e interpret the Constitution in light of its text, purposes, and ‘our
whole experience’ as a Nation. And we look to the actual practice of Government to inform our interpretation.”120 Justice Scalia accused the ma115. Hart, supra note 80, at 144. In assessing any disagreement, note that the original
meaning of the amended Constitution can be yielded by an ultimate rule of recognition on
which all may agree: “The rule of recognition is a customary rule of judges and other officials, but it is not legislated and is not positive law. In particular, it is not the formal constitution or any part of it. (Such a constitution must itself be validated by the rule of recognition.)” Green, Notes to the Third Edition, supra note 110, at 317.
116. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
117. I should note that I coauthored an amicus brief in the case. Brief of Constitutional
Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550
(2014) (No. 12-1281).
118. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2548 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577.
120. Id. at 2578 (citation omitted) (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433
(1920)). It is not clear whether this is intentional, but interpreting “the Constitution in
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jority of “sweep[ing] away the key textual limitations on the recessappointment power”121 and of allowing “the Executive [to] accumulate
power through adverse possession.”122
Justice Scalia also made the methodological stakes explicit:
The real tragedy of today’s decision . . . is the damage done
to our separation-of-powers jurisprudence more generally . . . .
The Court’s embrace of the adverse-possession theory of executive power (a characterization the majority resists but does not
refute) will be cited in diverse contexts, including those presently unimagined, and will have the effect of aggrandizing the
Presidency beyond its constitutional bounds and undermining
respect for the separation of powers.123
But while the opinions appear on their surface to reﬂect deep division about the status of the constitutional text and its original meaning,
that appearance may be illusory. For all that the opinions disagree
strongly about how to read the Clause and what its purpose was, they actually do agree—at least in theory—about the role of the text and its original meaning.
Justice Scalia accuses the majority of letting modern practice trump
the “clear text.”124 But the majority does not purport to have the authority to do that. Rather, the majority ﬁrst concludes that the text is “ambiguous,” looking to the text and structure of the Constitution and evidence
of its original meaning.125
It claims that its construction is permissible because “the Framers
likely did intend the Clause to apply to a new circumstance that so clearly
falls within its essential purposes, where doing so is consistent with the
Clause’s language.”126 That is the device of abstraction, noted above,127
and it is expressly hemmed in by—i.e., it must be “consistent with”—“the
Clause’s language.”128
The Court points to James Madison’s views about how practice could
“liquidate [and] settle the meaning” of ambiguous clauses.129 That is a
permissible device for resolving ambiguity, noted above.130 But again, it

light of its text” seems to suggest that the Constitution and “its text” aren’t exactly the
same; what sense would it make to interpret a document “in light of itself”?
121. Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 2617–18 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 2553 (majority opinion).
126. Id. at 2565.
127. Supra section I.B.1.
128. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2565.
129. Id. at 2560 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2,
1819), in 8 Writings of James Madison 447, 450 (G. Hunt ed. 1908)).
130. Supra section I.B.2.
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recognizes that for such liquidation to be permitted, “[t]he question is
whether the Clause is ambiguous.”131
In sum, the majority felt the need to ﬁght its way free from the
text—to demonstrate ambiguity—before it could turn to subsequent
practice. (Similarly, Justice Scalia agreed that when there is “an ambiguous text and a clear historical practice,” the practice controls.132)
Notably, the executive branch did not take the same view. When
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli was defending the appointments at oral
argument, Justice Scalia asked him this question point-blank: “What do
you do when there is a practice that . . . ﬂatly contradicts a clear text of
the Constitution? Which . . . of the two prevails?”133
The Solicitor General, like the majority, resisted the premise of the
question, but he ﬁrst responded that “the practice has to prevail.”134 Yet it
does not appear that that view has been recognized as the law.
The question of conﬂict between clear original meaning and other
sources of law (like practice or policy) does not arise that often. Many
opinions are simply silent on the question of methodological clashes.
Other times the Court attempts to mediate the conﬂict by emphasizing
the way that originalism can accommodate rules of law like precedent
and the like.135
For instance, Noel Canning cited other cases that it claimed “have
continually conﬁrmed Madison’s view” of liquidation.136 Not all of the
cases make their methodological hierarchy explicit, but several conﬁrm
the view in Noel Canning. In The Pocket Veto Case the Court endorsed
“practical construction” through practice, saying “long settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of . . . a constitutional provision the phraseology of which is in any
respect of doubtful meaning.”137 And in Mistretta v. United States, the Court
ﬁrst discussed the text and original history before concluding that subsequent practice provided “additional evidence.”138
And yet when there are explicit clashes, the original meaning wins.
For instance, in INS v. Chadha,139 the Court famously invalidated the legislative veto on formalistic, textual grounds. In response to “policy arguments” in favor of the legislative veto, the Court did not meet them on
their own terms, but rather said that “policy arguments supporting even
131. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2568.
132. Id. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring).
133. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (No. 12-1281).
134. Id. at 6–8.
135. See Fallon, Constructivist Coherence Theory, supra note 12, at 1240–43 (observing Court generally attempts to reconcile seemingly competing methods).
136. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560 (citing remaining cases in this paragraph).
137. 279 U.S. 655, 689–90 (1929) (emphasis added).
138. 488 U.S. 361, 399–401 (1989).
139. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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useful ‘political inventions’ are subject to the demands of the
Constitution,” and that those demands were textually “[e]xplicit and unambiguous.”140 Similarly, it closed with a coda reaffirming that the original meaning of the text was not subject to critique on consequentialist
grounds:
The choices we discern as having been made in the
Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental
processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable,
but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had
lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. There is no support in the
Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that
the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with explicit Constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President. With all the obvious
ﬂaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not
yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the
exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints
spelled out in the Constitution.141
Similarly, the Supreme Court’s originalist opinion in District of
Columbia v. Heller announced the supremacy of the original meaning over
policy concerns:
The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power
to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth
insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future
judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope
they were understood to have when the people adopted them,
whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges
think that scope too broad.142
Yet there is not an important case that does the opposite.
Analogously, the regular use of precedent by the Supreme Court in
constitutional cases does not pose a threat to constitutional textualism or
originalism, because precedent’s pedigree is itself consistent with originalism.143 But the Court’s periodic rejection of precedent in favor of original meaning suggests that precedent is not the ultimate source of law.
Indeed original meaning may be one of the most powerful bases for
overturning precedent. That is how, after decades of ad hoc adjudication

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 945.
Id. at 959 (citation omitted).
554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
Supra section I.B.3.
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under Ohio v. Roberts,144 the Court eventually invoked the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington.145
Invoking the text’s original meaning allows overruling courts to say
that a precedent was “wrong the day it was decided,” which is a key to the
Court’s ability to overrule its precedents.146 Similarly, Steven Calabresi has
surveyed the Court’s practice of overruling precedent in the twentieth
century and argues that “in our constitutional culture there is actually a
well-established Burkean practice and tradition of venerating the text
and ﬁrst principles of the Constitution and of appealing to it to trump
both contrary caselaw and contrary practices and traditions.”147
Again, it is true that most cases do not raise a question of priority either way. But when they do, inclusive originalism appears to have the
highest priority.
2. The Surprising Absence of Anti-Originalist Cases
a. Explicit Challenges to Originalism? (Blaisdell, Brown, Miranda,
Lawrence). — Let us now turn to cases that have been argued to show
that originalism is not the law, or not the ultimate account of our legal
practice.
One of the most frequently cited examples of an anti-originalist
opinion is the New Deal decision of Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell.148
Blaisdell interpreted the Contract Clause of the Constitution to permit
Minnesota to impose a temporary mortgage moratorium. In doing so,
the Court is said to have “expressly rejected originalism,”149 and to have
“freely conceded” that the law violated the “original understanding.”150
The opinion is said to be “blatant anti-originalism”151 and a “signiﬁcant
non-originalist triumph[].”152 Even Randy Barnett, who claims that “the

144. 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980) (holding confrontation rights turn on “indicia of reliability”).
145. 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (overruling Roberts in favor of “original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause”).
146. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 677, 696–98 (2005).
147. Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent,
and Burke, 57 Ala. L. Rev. 635, 637 (2006); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 34 n.29 (2000) (discussing “triumph of
the document over the doctrine” in incorporating Bill of Rights).
148. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
149. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Elusive Quest for Value Neutral Judging: A Response to
Redish and Arnould, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1539, 1541 (2012).
150. Charles A. Bieneman, Legal Interpretation and a Constitutional Case: Home
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2534, 2537 (1992).
151. Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 18 (1998).
152. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L.J. 657, 677–78 (2009) [hereinafter
Greene, Selling].
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Supreme Court has rarely repudiated original meaning expressly” concedes that “[p]erhaps the closest it came to this was in . . . Blaisdell.”153
Part I helps us to see that these claims are mistaken. It may well be
that the outcome of Blaisdell was wrong as a matter of original meaning, as
Justice Sutherland argued for the four horsemen in dissent. But the reasoning of Blaisdell is surprisingly anodyne.
On its face, the moratorium seemed to impair pre-existing contractual rights, despite the constitutional requirement that “[n]o [s]tate . . .
pass any . . . [l]aw impairing the [o]bligation of [c]ontracts.”154 The
Court noted that the lower courts had nonetheless “upheld the statute as
an emergency measure,” and also discussed the role of emergency.155 In
affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court ﬁrst insisted that changed
circumstances could not change the meaning of the Constitution:
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase
granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed
upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted
in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the
Federal Government and its limitations of the power of the
States were determined in the light of emergency, and they are
not altered by emergency. What power was thus granted and
what limitations were thus imposed are questions which have always been, and always will be, the subject of close examination
under our constitutional system.
While emergency does not create power, emergency may
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power. “Although an
emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived,
nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of
a living power already enjoyed.”156
The Court’s speciﬁc theory of emergency powers was also perfectly
consistent with modern originalist views about resolving open-textured
phrases:
When the provisions of the Constitution, in grant or restriction,
are speciﬁc, so particularized as not to admit of construction, no
question is presented. Thus, emergency would not permit a
State to have more than two Senators in the Congress, or permit
the election of President by a general popular vote without regard to the number of electors to which the States are respectively entitled, or permit the States to “coin money” or to “make
anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.”
But where constitutional grants and limitations of power are set
forth in general clauses, which afford a broad outline, the pro-

153. Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 Fordham L. Rev.
411, 432 (2013).
154. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
155. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 420 (1934).
156. Id. at 425–26 (quoting Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917)).
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cess of construction is essential to ﬁll in the details. That is true
of the contract clause.157
To be sure, there is some reason to believe that Founding-era lawyers
would have expected a mortgage moratorium to violate the Contract
Clause.158 But originalism often requires one to read the constitutional
text beyond its speciﬁc expectations. Even the dissent agreed, for example, that “[t]he provisions of the federal Constitution, undoubtedly, are
pliable in the sense that in appropriate cases they have the capacity of
bringing within their grasp every new condition which falls within their
meaning.”159 The debate between the majority and the dissent was a debate about the level of abstraction at which the text was originally written.
Again, the Court might have been wrong, as a textual matter, to conclude that the Contract Clause was “general” and “admit[ted] of construction,”160 but it was asking precisely the kinds of question about the
original meaning of the Contract Clause that I have argued that originalism ought to embrace. As Thomas Colby has observed, “if we read
Hughes’ language with an anachronistic, New Originalist eye to terminology, it actually appears to be a paragon of the New Originalism rather
than nonoriginalism.”161
Another canonical nonoriginalist opinion is Miranda v. Arizona.162
Miranda is usually put forth not as an example of an anti-originalist decision so much as a prophylactic one.163 The canonicity of Miranda seems to
legitimate a certain kind of prophylactic decisionmaking. For example,
David Strauss argues that by analogy to Miranda, “the most signiﬁcant aspects of ﬁrst amendment law can be seen as judge-made prophylactic
rules that exceed the requirements of the ‘real’ ﬁrst amendment.”164 The
key worry is not just that Miranda is an example of a constitutional “decision rule,”165 but that it is a particularly anti-originalist one where the
157. Id. at 428.
158. See id. at 453–56 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (discussing original expectations);
Jed Rubenfeld, Reply to Commentators, 115 Yale L.J. 2093, 2093–94 (2006) (arguing
Blaisdell “repudiate[s] a foundational Application Understanding”).
159. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 451 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 428 (majority opinion); see McGinnis & Rappaport, Abstract Meaning,
supra note 27, at 768 (accusing Blaisdell of committing abstract meaning fallacy).
161. Colby, supra note 57, at 767.
162. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
163. See generally William Baude, Understanding Prophylactic Supreme Court Decisions,
Jotwell (July 14, 2014), http://conlaw.jotwell.com/understanding-prophylactic-supremecourt-decisions [http://perma.cc/W3G7-R484] (reviewing John F. Stinneford, The Illusory
Eighth Amendment, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 437 (2013)) (discussing debates about Miranda as
“prophylactic”).
164. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 198
(1988).
165. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 61 (2004)
[hereinafter Berman, Decision Rules]; see also Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights
and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 220, 221 (2006), available at
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Court successfully claimed the power to make constitutional law that exceeded the law created by the written Constitution itself.166
Yet a closer examination of Miranda and its subsequent interpretation does not show the triumph of prophylactic, supratextualist lawmaking. Miranda itself, for example, does not ﬁrst (1) describe the requirement of the constitutional text, and then (2) create an additional rule to
provide the prophylactic protection. Rather, the Miranda Court ﬂirted
with at least three different theories of what constituted impermissible
compulsion,167 and its rule underprotected against two of them (trickery
and custodial interrogation). In other words Miranda may well be a constitutional decision rule, but not a “prophylactic” one in this sense.
Instead, the narrative of Miranda as a “prophylactic” decision seems
to derive in part from the many subsequent cases that cabined Miranda’s
reach.168 Calling Miranda “prophylactic” seemed to justify making further
exceptions to it on a policy basis. The apparent idea is that as judge-made
doctrine, Miranda was either illegitimate or at least of lesser status.169
While the Court did not carry this logic so far as to justify overruling
Miranda itself, when it preserved Miranda it did so by reemphasizing its
connection to the constitutional ban on compelled testimony.170 Indeed,
the Court’s opinion in Dickerson v. United States uses the word “prophylactic” only once, in quoting and distinguishing the prior cases.171
The Miranda example is complicated. It does not actually dispute
Strauss’s point that much constitutional doctrine is phrased at a more
speciﬁc level than the constitutional text and necessarily takes into account the Court’s institutional capacity. But it does suggest that even in
doctrinal areas that seem to be explicitly based on common-law decisionmaking, it is important that there be a textual and originalist claim at
the core of the doctrine.
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2488&context=faculty_sch
olarship [http://perma.cc/QBL6-ZYMU] (providing further elaboration).
166. It is also possible that this distinction is illusory, see Berman, Decision Rules,
supra note 165, at 43–50 (suggesting it is), in which case the existence of constitutional
doctrine, even prophlyactic doctrine, is unlikely to be particularly threatening to inclusive
originalism.
167. Stinneford, supra note 163, at 464.
168. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653–55 (1984) (describing Miranda as
“prophylactic” and rejecting Miranda claim); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974)
(same combination); cf. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) (labeling Miranda
“prophylactic” and ruling against analogous claim).
169. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention
to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Geo. L.J. 1, 19–20 (2010) (suggesting this was theme of
Rehnquist Court’s Miranda jurisprudence).
170. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432–34 (2000) (describing history
leading up to Miranda); see also Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 73 n.4
(2009) (“[T]he underlying requirement at issue in . . . [Miranda] that confessions be voluntary had roots going back centuries.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
171. 530 U.S. at 438.
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Then, of course, there is Brown v. Board of Education.172 Brown is utterly canonical. As Michael McConnell has famously written, “Such is the
moral authority of Brown that if any particular theory does not produce
the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the theory is seriously
discredited.”173 And Brown is frequently cited as an embarrassment to
originalists.174 If Brown does repudiate the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that is a big problem for the positive-law theory
of originalism.175
But Brown did not repudiate originalism and did not ignore it either.
Before issuing its decision, the Court called for reargument speciﬁcally
on several aspects of the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, asking the parties to address:
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State legislatures and conventions which ratiﬁed the
Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate,
understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of
the framers of the Amendment
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their
power under section 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such
segregation of its own force?
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a)
and (b) do not dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial
power, in construing the Amendment, to abolish segregation in
public schools?176
That is the general kind of inquiry that inclusive originalism asks the
Court to make. And Brown itself spends several pages at the very beginning of the opinion ﬁghting the original-meaning question to a draw,
172. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
173. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L.
Rev. 947, 952 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Originalism]; see also Akhil Reed Amar,
America’s Unwritten Constitution 247 (2012) [hereinafter Amar, Unwritten Constitution]
(noting Brown has “special constitutional authority”); Greene, Selling, supra note 152, at
679 (“Polite company requires, after all, that constitutional methodologies be premised on
Brown’s correctness . . . .”).
174. See McConnell, Originalism, supra note 173, at 951–52 (citing sources).
175. But see Sachs, Constitution-in-Exile, supra note 69, at 2278 (“The general structure of our constitutional practices leans against the idea that Brown, or any other accepted constitutional landmark, effectively stands on its own bottom.”).
176. Miscellaneous Orders, 345 U.S. 972, 972–73 (1953). There were also two remedial questions. See id.
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concluding that “[t]his discussion and our own investigation convince us
that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve
the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive.”177
Similarly, Alexander Bickel’s famous article on Brown argues that the
Fourteenth Amendment was originally meant to be read at a high, and
perhaps evolving, level of abstraction that justiﬁed the Supreme Court’s
decision.178 Bickel’s article was based on a memo he had written as a law
clerk for Justice Felix Frankfurter.179 Frankfurter apparently “had asked
Bickel to prepare the memorandum so that Frankfurter would be in a
position to counter claims by lawyers for the Southern states that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to allow states to adopt
segregated education if they chose.”180 Ultimately, Mark Tushnet and
Katya Lezin report, “Frankfurter was satisﬁed that Bickel’s research at
least neutralized the states’ claim.”181 This episode provides evidence that
Brown was just as afraid of originalism as originalism is afraid of Brown. Of
course, since 1954, Brown’s political and legal foundations have become
secure. But it remains important that nothing in Brown’s official canonicity contradicts originalism’s legal status.182
A closer example of explicitly anti-originalist reasoning from the
Supreme Court may come in its recent cases about liberty and same-sex
relationships. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court invalidated Texas’s ban on
“certain intimate sexual conduct.”183 In doing so, the Court did “note[]
that there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at
homosexual conduct as a distinct matter,” relying on several amicus
briefs.184 But it also equivocated on the importance of that history. It said
177. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
178. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 59–65 (1955).
179. Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of
Education, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1867, 1882 n.84 (1991).
180. Id. at 1919.
181. Id.; see also Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 618–19 (1975) (quoting Thurgood
Marshall on originalist arguments: “A nothin’-to-nothin’ score means we win the ball
game.”).
182. The Brown–Bickel thesis about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
might also be the best way to read seemingly antihistoric election law cases like Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause
is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era.”), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 567 (1964) (“Representation schemes once fair and equitable become archaic and
outdated.”). It is also possible that those cases reﬂect a method of analysis that the Court
would never repeat anew today outside of precedent, infra section II.C.2, and that they are
partly for this reason not exactly part of the modern constitutional canon. Compare
Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 Const. Comment. 295,
296 (2000) (“[S]ustained attention to democracy itself has been startlingly absent from
the constitutional canon . . . .”), with Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379,
392 n.68 (2011) (“These cases are . . . arguably part of the constitutional canon.”).
183. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
184. Id. at 568.
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that it “need not enter this debate in the attempt to reach a deﬁnitive
historical judgment,”185 and ultimately went on to say: “In all events we
think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.”186 Lawrence can be read as being content to ﬁnd historical
ambiguity and therefore postpone any true conﬂict with originalism, like
Brown, but ultimately it may itself be ambiguous on this score.
The Court continued the thread in Obergefell v. Hodges,187 where it
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to license
same-sex marriages. Yet that opinion seemed to pick the originalist route.
First, the Court noted that the interpretation of fundamental rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment was “guided by many of the
same considerations relevant to analysis of other constitutional provisions
that set forth broad principles rather than speciﬁc requirements,”188
which sounds in ordinary “new originalism.”
Second, the Court added, in a nod to Lawrence, that “[h]istory and
tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries,”189 which might seem to reject the inclusive originalist framework.
But, third, the Court then argued that this evolving reasoning itself
had an originalist pedigree:
The generations that wrote and ratiﬁed the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to
future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons
to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and
a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.190
This ﬁnal claim about the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning has a structure quite similar to Bickel’s defense of Brown, and it is a
structure that is consistent with inclusive originalism. Again, “[w]hy be
more ‘originalist’ than the Founders, or more Catholic than the Pope?”191
And once again, this sort of living originalism might also be subject to
historical and legal falsiﬁcation—maybe the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did “presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its
dimensions,” or maybe the Court is right that they didn’t. Or maybe they
didn’t presume to know, but also didn’t leave the Court the power to

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id. at 571–72.
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Id. at 2598.
Id. (citing Lawrence).
Id.
Sachs, Change, supra note 16, at 821.
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expound that freedom as it did.192 But asking those questions is what an
inclusive originalist would do.
So even in one of its most potentially anti-originalist moments, the
Court ultimately claimed ﬁdelity to the Amendment’s original authors.
b. Implicit Challenges to Originalism? (Roe, Reed, Gideon . . . ). — So
the key cases that are sometimes thought to explicitly repudiate originalism do not necessarily do so upon closer examination. But of course the
list of potential ﬁxed stars does not necessarily end there. Several other
cases are sometimes listed not because they say anything outright contrary
to originalism, but because they are thought to be so obviously inconsistent with originalism that they implicitly reject it. Because these cases
do not say anything outright, I am not sure how much weight they ought
to have, but I consider them here.
Roe v. Wade193 may well be too deeply contested to serve as a constitutional “ﬁxed star” that might defeat a commitment to originalism. At the
same time, if Roe repudiates originalism, and a signiﬁcant number of officials support Roe’s reasoning, that might at least show that a signiﬁcant
number repudiate originalism. Yet the opinion in Roe is not obviously
hostile to originalist reasoning. The very ﬁrst sentences of the substantive
analysis of the case caution that “[i]t perhaps is not generally appreciated
that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States
today are of relatively recent vintage,” and that they derive from “the latter half of the 19th century.”194 Later, the Court added: “It was not until
after the War Between the States,” (and hence, the Court seems to imply, after the Fourteenth Amendment) “that legislation began generally to replace the common law.”195 And in a later portion of its opinion that holds
that the unborn are not themselves “persons” protected by the

192. Though mostly beside the present point, it is worth noting that many originalists
did suggest that there were plausible originalist arguments in favor of the claimants’ position. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah Begley, Originalism and Same Sex Marriage 3
(Nw. Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 14-51, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2509443 (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Michael Ramsey, Is There an Originalist Case for SameSex Marriage?, The Originalism Blog (Mar. 25, 2013), http://originalismblog.typepad.
com/the-originalism-blog/2013/03/is-there-an-originalist-case-for-same-sex-marriage-mich
ael-ramsey.html [http://perma.cc/PEZ2-RVXJ]; Mike Rappaport, More on Originalism and
Same Sex Marriage: A Response to Mike Ramsey, Library of Law & Liberty (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2013/04/25/more-on-originalism-and-same-sex-marriage-aresponse-to-mike-ramsey [http://perma.cc/Y5S4-MJUE]; Francis Wilkinson, Originalism,
Scalia, and Gay Marriage: An Interview with Jack Balkin, Bloomberg View (Mar. 26, 2013,
10:05 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-03-26/originalism-scalia-and-gay
-marriage-an-interview-with-jack-balkin [http://perma.cc/96XL-TSG5]. But see William N.
Eskridge Jr., The Marriage Equality Cases and Constitutional Theory, 2015 Cato Sup. Ct.
Rev. 111, 112–21 (arguing there were strong originalist arguments that Obergefell court did
not adopt).
193. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
194. Id. at 129.
195. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
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Fourteenth Amendment, the only real arguments are textual and
originalist.196
Obviously many originalists oppose Roe; indeed, some have claimed
that people are originalists because they oppose Roe.197 But from the point
of view of positive theory, Roe seems at most like a case where the
“scorer” was “wrong,” rather than one where it “repudiate[d] the scoring
rule.”198
Moreover, it is noteworthy that later attempts by legal officials to solidify the legal status of Roe have turned on precedent, rather than nonoriginalist reasoning. For instance, when the Supreme Court explicitly
confronted and reaffirmed the “essential holding” of Roe in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, it did so on the basis of
precedent.199 Similarly, Supreme Court nominees have been asked to
concede Roe’s status as precedent or “super precedent.”200
Similarly, Mary Anne Case maintains that “no version of original meaning . . . holds much promise for yielding” constitutional rules against sex
discrimination and that a committed feminist ought to reject originalism
for that reason.201 One could draw from this argument a claim that the
Court’s widely accepted decisions holding sex discrimination unconstitutional show that originalism is not entirely the law.
On balance, though, I would reject this claim as well. When Ruth
Bader Ginsburg was litigating on behalf of the ACLU, she asserted that
“[b]oldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically from the original
understanding, is required” to yield a constitutional rule against sex discrimination.202 If that kind of claim had been made by the Court, it
would probably be a counterexample to originalism’s legal status. But the
Court’s reasoning in its important sex discrimination cases has not gone
196. See id. at 157–58 (canvassing text’s use of word “person” ﬁrst, before then relying
on claim that “throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion
practices were far freer than they are today,” and then ﬁnally noting lower courts had
reached same conclusion).
197. See George Kannar, Comment, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia,
99 Yale L.J. 1297, 1309 (1990) (“It is not unkind to attribute former Attorney General
Meese’s espousal of [originalism] . . . to a result-oriented interest in eliminating affirmative action and overruling Roe v. Wade.”).
198. Hart, supra note 80, at 144. But see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 947 (1973) (claiming, though not as originalist,
Roe “is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be”).
199. 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992). To be sure, Casey’s theory of precedent has in turn
been criticized by originalists, see, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, Good Constitution, supra
note 34, at 189–91, but that is a question of the substance of the doctrine, not the
authority.
200. Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1204, 1226–30 (2006).
201. Mary Anne Case, The Ladies? Forget About Them. A Feminist Perspective on the
Limits of Originalism, 29 Const. Comment. 431, 445, 448 (2014).
202. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights
Amendments, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 161, 161.
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that far—not the recent decision in United States v. Virginia,203 nor the
original generative decision in Reed v. Reed.204
So the cases’ reasoning does not seem to directly confront originalism, which may be enough to close the matter. But for those who might
think these cases are an implicit rejection of originalism it is worth noting that originalists have recently argued that the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, perhaps inﬂuenced by the Nineteenth, does
forbid sex discrimination.205 Others have argued that even if the Court’s
sex discrimination cases could be shown to be wrong as a matter of original meaning, they should be preserved as “entrenched precedent.”206
This doctrine, too, ultimately seems consistent with the legal status of
originalism.
On occasion, Gideon v. Wainwright 207 is offered as another example
of a ﬁxed star that refutes the legal status of originalism.208 It is not entirely clear that Gideon remains a ﬁxed star today,209 but if it is, it is another example of a case that seems relatively neutral toward originalist
reasoning. Gideon required states to provide counsel to the indigent,
through a combination of the Sixth Amendment’s “right . . . to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense” and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
right to “due process.”210 Since the Sixth Amendment at the time of the
Founding was thought only to vindicate the right to hire one’s own counsel,211 Gideon seems like it ought to be a rejection of originalism.

203. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
204. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The four-Justice opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson recounts the “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,” but it also purports to be
an application of “‘traditional’ equal protection analysis,” as laid out by precedent, to new
facts. 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.).
205. See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination,
90 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (2011) (claiming sex discrimination violates original meaning of
Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the
Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 857, 901
(2009) (stating sex discrimination “largely” violates original meaning of Fourteenth
Amendment). But see Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional
Understanding, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1229, 1230 (2000) (arguing Fourteenth Amendment
“was understood not to disturb the prevailing regime of state laws imposing very substantial legal disabilities on women”).
206. McGinnis & Rappaport, Good Constitution, supra note 34, 181–85.
207. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
208. See William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the
Signiﬁcance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 Ohio St. L.J.
1251, 1264–66 (2011) (“Gideon . . . reﬂects the progressive understanding of how constitutional guarantees should be applied to meet existing conditions.”).
209. Id. at 1265 & n.103 (noting some are skeptical of Gideon “[p]erhaps” because it is
“not originalist”).
210. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV.
211. Alexander Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20
N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 1, 7–8 (1944).
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And yet the opinion in Gideon itself, written by Justice Black, is almost entirely about precedent. The Court saw Gideon as posing a conﬂict
between several lines of cases: The Court had previously held (in Johnson
v. Zerbst 212) that federal courts must provide counsel to the indigent but
also held (in Betts v. Brady 213) that state courts need not. On the other
hand it had also held that fundamental federal rights should be incorporated against the states. In Gideon, the Court concluded that the incorporation principle was sufficiently strong to justify overruling Betts.214 (That
incorporation principle, by the way, had long been championed by Justice
Black on straightforwardly originalist grounds.215) Originalism did not force
the Court to disentangle these precedents in a particular way, and the
Court’s opinion did not contradict it.
To be sure, it may well be that if one went back to ﬁrst principles,
one could conclude that the results in Gideon (and presumably Johnson)
were wrong. (Although even that point would require an investigation of
whether the Due Process Clause’s original meaning now requires counsel
in light of the way criminal trials are currently run.216) But again, it is hard
to see in this putatively nonoriginalist outcome, now protected by precedent, a ﬁxed star that repudiates originalism.
C.

Two Complications and a Conclusion

This basic picture of our constitutional practices—both in Supreme
Court decisions and at a more general level—is of course just a beginning, but hopefully it is the beginning of an answer to the positive question. Here, I’ll consider two important complications to that picture and
then summarize the results. Section II.C.1 deals with the possibility that
judicial statements about interpretation are insincere; section II.C.2 deals
with the possibility that our law was once unoriginalist and has become
originalist only recently; section II.C.3 provides a conclusion for all of
Part II.
1. Judicial Insincerity. — The previous section suggested that canonical Supreme Court opinions are consistent with inclusive originalism.
This analysis of this part of our lower-order practices assumes, however,
that we can take what judges say about the law as evidence of what the
law is. That may seem naïve, or at least contestable. Many scholars believe
212. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
213. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
214. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–42 (1963) (collecting cases).
215. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89–91 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment [was] to extend to all the people
of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights.”); Akhil Reed Amar, 2000
Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1221, 1223–34
(2002) (crediting modern incorporation doctrine to Black).
216. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,
53 Calif. L. Rev. 929, 945–46 (1965) (suggesting due process rationale); see also Akhil
Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 707–08 (1996) (same).
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they can provide better accounts of the true criteria of judicial
decisionmaking.
For instance, Richard Primus maintains that certain widely invoked
claims about constitutional law should be seen as “continuity tenders”—
formulaic statements by which a governing group invokes connection
with tradition.217 These statements are “symbolic” and “it would miss the
point . . . to insist on making reality conform to the world that the formula seems to describe.”218 Primus suggests that the American claim that
the federal government has limited powers and the English claim that
law is made by the “Queen-in-Parliament” are examples of ritual continuity tenders.219
Primus suggests that many invocations of Founding-era views are
symbolic in this way.220 Eric Posner has similarly suggested that invocations of originalism are symbolic. As Posner puts it, to the branches of the
federal government:
[T]he founding-era document is little more than a rhetorical
ﬂourish, used strategically. That is our political culture, one that
happens to require ritual obeisance to the founders. Thus
would the Roman priests examine the entrails of birds in preparation for a great political event. How long would one of those
priests have lasted if he really thought he could discover in
those entrails the will of the gods?221
To some extent these arguments sidestep the premise of this Essay
and its predecessors,222 and a full discussion of this kind of legal realism
may require a separate treatment elsewhere. But I will brieﬂy state that I
do think it is a mistake to dismiss the public reasoning by which the
Court purports to justify its actions.

217. Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 114 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 8), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2471924 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
218. Id. (manuscript at 10).
219. Id. (manuscript at 13–27); cf. Hart, supra note 80, at 107–08, 111 (discussing
“what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law” as “rule of recognition”).
220. Primus, supra note 217, (manuscript at 19–23).
221. Eric Posner, Originalism Class 4: Brown (Jan. 30, 2014), http://ericposner.com/
originalism-class-4-brown/ [http://perma.cc/66QH-ZU63]. The post is part of a dialogue
arising out of a class we taught together, and this section expands on part of my response.
Will Baude, Originalism, the Bear Principle, and the Reading of Entrails, Volokh Conspiracy
(Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/01/
31/originalism-the-bear-principle-and-the-reading-of-entrails [https://perma.cc/P4G3-X
A5C] [hereinafter Baude, Bear Principle]; see also Andrew Koppelman, Passive Aggressive:
Scalia and Garner on Interpretation, 41 Boundary 2: Int’l J. Literature & Culture 227, 231
(2014) (“[T]hey’ve been reshaping the law as they like, reciting originalist slogans as they
go, in the spirit of rowers who sing together as they lay on the oars. The music does not
make the boat go, but it encourages the crew.”).
222. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (noting previous inquiries have looked
to Supreme Court opinions).
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Consider this scenario: Suppose we lived in a world whose judicial
system looked, to most legal observers, exactly like ours—judges issued
opinions based on the Constitution, the U.S. Code, the common law, and
the various precedents interpreting them. But suppose a few canny professors ﬁgured out that the judges were all secretly part of an Illuminati
conspiracy, ruling entirely for the beneﬁt of their secret overlords and
just pretending they were following the Constitution and these other
sources. Would we say that actually the Illuminati instructions are the law
because they describe the secret practice of the judges? Or would we say
that the judges were part of a widespread conspiracy to subvert the law? I
would say the latter, and I think many others would as well.
One possible reason for this is that Supreme Court opinions might
give us evidence of how the rest of our legal system works even if the authors have mixed reasons for writing them the way they do. Perhaps judicial opinions reﬂect not only the legal beliefs of the authoring Justice,
but the norms of that Justice’s colleagues, and the norms generally accepted by other parts of official practice.223
Furthermore, while Hart’s positivist theory seems to look to the practice of government officials,224 a popular-constitutionalist alternative holds
that positive constitutional law comes from popular practice rather than
official practice.225 Under this alternative, American citizens are treated
as the authors of our constitutional law and hence the jurisprudential
equivalent of government officials.226 Under this alternative, judicial invocation of original meaning may reﬂect that those authorities are what
have popular purchase.227
More generally, I think Primus and Posner are too ready to characterize high-level claims about law as only symbolic. They are certainly not
only symbolic in form, the way an epigraphic quotation is. They look like
legal arguments. It may well be true that our high-level formulae and lowlevel practices are not always consistent. But it is not clear that the highlevel formulae should be dismissed as insincere any more than the lowlevel practices should be dismissed as opportunistic. So long as legal interpreters strain to reconcile the two, to show that the practices and the
formula are consistent, that is evidence that the formula is thought to
223. That is why I said they were exemplary rather than exhaustive. See supra text
accompanying note 111.
224. See Green, Notes to the Third Edition, supra note 110, at 361 (“For Hart, ultimate rules of recognition inhere in customary practices by officials.”).
225. See Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 719, 729–45 (2006) (outlining this
alternative); see also Schauer, Force, supra note 74, at 207 n.17 (citing sources).
226. See Strauss, Neo-Hamiltonian, supra note 75, at 2678 (“One way or another . . .
the People are the ﬁnal authority on what the Constitution requires.”).
227. Barry Friedman, The Will of the People 367–76 (2009) (discussing connection
between popular will and Supreme Court opinions); see also sources cited supra notes 81–
84 (discussing popular beliefs about originalism).
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have some bite. For instance, the fact—if it is true—that interpreters
throughout history have tried to ﬁnd ways to characterize text as ambiguous228 does not show that unambiguous text is empty or symbolic; if anything, it shows that it is thought binding.
I am not certain about these things, and this may be a dispute as to
which neither side has met a compelling burden of proof, but there is
reason to be cautious about categorical rejections of sincerity.229 Primus
acknowledges, for instance, that some Justices believe that the limited
powers formulation is not just a ritual,230 which suggests that the answer
might well differ for different groups of judges.
2. Constitutional Interregnums. — In claiming that our current social
practices represent originalism, I am not necessarily claiming that originalism has continuously been the law. One could maintain that the original
meaning of the Constitution has always been the law (with formal amendments, of course)—as much in 1880 or 1970 as in 1789 or today.231 But
contemporary positivist originalism need not make so strong a claim.
Contemporary legal regimes can also claim faith with the distant past
while skipping over intermediate regimes that adopted a different rule of
recognition. The intermediate regime becomes a sort of constitutional
interregnum, like the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell before the
Restoration.232
For instance, it may well be true that certain periods of our constitutional history would not present as much positive legal support for originalism as there is today. Despite the gestures at originalism in cases like
Brown and Roe, portions of the Warren and Burger Courts, for example,
might be seen as a period during which the generally accepted constitutional law was something other than originalism.233
228. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional
Text, 64 Duke L.J. 1213, 1238–67 (2015).
229. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 987, 991 (2008) (deﬁning and defending duty of judicial sincerity).
230. Primus, supra note 217 (manuscript at 18) (“None of this is to claim that Justices
who articulate internal limits are in the secret recesses of their minds saying, ‘I will appear
to take internal limits seriously, but I will also ensure that Congress retains the ability to
regulate more or less as it sees ﬁt.’”).
231. See James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and
Critique, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1991) [hereinafter Gardner, Positivist Foundations] (“[O]ur
courts, for better or for worse, continue to speak the language of originalism—as indeed
they have since the founding of the republic.”).
232. See Sachs, Change, supra note 16, at 847–48 (making this point). Tangentially,
for a deep exploration of legal continuity in English law, see generally Richard S. Kay, The
Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law (2014).
233. See, e.g., Gardner, Positivist Foundations, supra note 231, at 13 (asserting departure from originalist tradition during part of late twentieth century); Edwin Meese III,
Reagan’s Legal Revolutionary, 3 Green Bag 2d 193, 196 (2000) (criticizing courts’ abandonment of originalism from late 1950s through 1970s). But see Amar, Unwritten
Constitution, supra note 173, at 141–99 (discussing “general ﬁdelity of the Warren Court
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More historically, one might well make similar claims about constitutional law in the post-Reconstruction part of the nineteenth century. During that time period the Supreme Court repeatedly embraced a theory of
“inherent powers” that dispensed with the constitutional constraints of
the text.234 I have elsewhere suggested that such a doctrine “is at odds
with the basic idea of enumeration” and can ﬁnd “no indication in the
text.”235
At the same time, other historical periods might provide comparable
or stronger support for positivist originalism. For instance, the
Reconstruction Amendments were enacted in putative compliance with
Article V of the original Constitution rather than in open deﬁance of
it.236 Franklin Roosevelt responded to the constitutional challenges to his
legislative agenda by emphasizing that his arguments were truer to the
Constitution’s original understanding.237
Indeed some critics appear to believe that the nonpluralist form of
originalism was ﬁrst invented in the 1980s by Attorney General Meese
and Justice Scalia.238 While I know of no originalist who holds this view of
the history,239 and I ﬁnd it rather dubious myself, originalism could be
the positive law even if that were true. For purposes of our current law, established by our current social practices, adjudicating these historical disputes does not matter.

to the deepest ideals of the written Constitution”); Cross, supra note 14, at 92–98
(highlighting use of originalism by Warren and Burger courts).
234. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 250 (2002) (chronicling this trend in “cases over Indians, aliens, and territories”); see also William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 Yale
L.J. 1738, 1802–03 (2013) [hereinafter Baude, Rethinking] (suggesting it extended to
domestic constitutional disputes as well).
235. Baude, Rethinking, supra note 234, at 1801; see also Michael D. Ramsey, The
Constitution’s Text in Foreign Affairs 1–43 (2007) (arguing “inherent” powers idea is
“extra-constitutional”). But see Johnathan O’Neill, Originalism in American Law and
Politics 24 (2005) (claiming originalism was dominant in late nineteenth century).
236. See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 375, 390–93 (2001) (arguing Reconstruction purported to comply with constitutional rules); see also Baude, Rethinking, supra note 234, at 1812 (“The Constitution
was not abolished and replaced; it was amended.”). But see Ackerman, supra note 75, at
113–15, 241–47 (suggesting enactment process was self-consciously not formalist).
237. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15459 [http://perma.cc/2GGU-25PC]; see also Balkin,
Living, supra note 59, at 87, 310 (discussing Roosevelt’s invocation of original meaning).
238. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 545, 547, 554–61 (2006) (linking originalism’s
“claim of methodological exclusivity” to 1980s political practice). Others have provided
this view more pointedly in conversation. Cf. Philip Larkin, Annus Mirabilis, in High
Windows 34, 34 (1974).
239. See, e.g., Office of Legal Policy, Original Meaning Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook
2, 50–57 (1987) (claiming originalism has “predominated” for most of American history).
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Chronicling these eras of constitutional law240 might well be valuable
for other purposes. For instance, we might want to emphasize originalism’s fragility and contingency,241 or to ﬁgure out when, as a matter of
legal realism, originalist arguments are most likely to hold sway.
But for purposes of understanding our current legal commitments,
the past matters only to the extent we currently grant it such authority.
That is why the previous discussion242 focused on cases that remain important and perhaps canonical now rather than analyzing, say, Escobedo v.
Illinois,243 or the Passenger Cases,244 which were very important, but only in
their day.
3. A Conclusion. — So what does all of this add up to? I am not saying that everything that has ever happened, or even everything that happens today, is consistent with what an originalist would do. But I am saying that when you look at our current legal commitments, as a whole,
they can be reconciled with originalism. Indeed, not only can they be
reconciled, but originalism seems to best describe our current law.
Our higher-order practices point toward textualism and originalism.
Our lower-order practices are messier, but once originalism is understood inclusively, they actually seem to point toward inclusive originalism
as well.
And even if there are a few counterexamples in our lower-order
practices, they do not necessarily mean that originalism can’t be our law.
First, those lower-order practices must be understood in light of our
higher-order practices, which continue to point toward some form of
originalism. And if the lower-order counterexamples become sufficiently
frequent or sufficiently blatant, one must ultimately make the tough positive judgment about whether “the game has changed” because of those
mis-scores.245
If this picture of our practice is correct, it suggests debates about
originalism may have relied on a false dichotomy. One need not choose
between a hard form of originalism that excludes all other forms of legal
reasoning and a soft form of originalism that treats originalism as just one
form among many. There is a middle position: Originalism is not one
methodology among many; it is ﬁrst among equals.

240. For a historical survey of theories on constitutional meaning, see Morton J. Horwitz,
Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism,
107 Harv. L. Rev. 30, 41–64 (1993).
241. Cf. Greene, Origins, supra note 89, at 87–88 (suggesting increasing demographic
diversity and the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis might revitalize nonoriginalist theories); Meese,
supra note 233, at 193 (“I am not sure that originalism has won an enduring victory.”).
242. Supra section II.B.2.
243. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
244. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
245. Hart, supra note 80, at 144.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS UNDERSTANDING OF ORIGINALISM
The foregoing account of originalism’s legal status is descriptive. But
of course originalists and their critics are ultimately arguing about how
judges ought to decide cases. So the question remains how this descriptive
account of our legal practice has normative implications. While that
question is not the main contribution of this Essay, I nonetheless advance
some tentative thoughts here about how the positivist turn may have normative payoff. In a nutshell, it’s because judges ought to obey the law—at
least as a prima facie matter. This normative argument is much thinner
and more broadly accepted than ﬁrst-order normative justiﬁcations for
originalism. If a positive inquiry into our practices suggests that inclusive
originalism is the law, then it has a privileged normative position compared to stricter and looser methods of interpretation.
Section III.A sketches out some of the reasons for the widelyaccepted judicial duty to obey the law, as well as possible limits to that
duty. Section III.B puts a ﬁner point on what is required or forbidden if
there is a judicial duty to inclusive originalism. Section III.C discusses a
different implication: the contingent nature of American originalism and
its implications (or lack thereof) for state and foreign constitutions.
A.

Judicial Duty

Let’s ﬁrst, in section III.A.1, consider the duty itself, and then, in
section III.A.2, consider its limits.
1. The Obligation. — The legal status of originalism is important for
how judges decide cases. It is generally agreed that judges have some
kind of prima facie obligation to remain within the bounds of the law—
whatever those bounds may be.246 Indeed, this may be why, as Judge
Posner writes, “most judges most of the time downpedal the creative or
legislative role in judging,”247 and why, as Michael McConnell recounts,
“[w]hen the late Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. was asked in a television
interview why the Nazis should be permitted to march through a neighborhood inhabited by Holocaust survivors, he responded: ‘the First
Amendment, the First Amendment, the First Amendment.’”248
Legal interpretation is a deeply authority-based practice, in which interpreters point to some decision made by somebody outside themselves
246. This is a moral intuition, not an axiom of legal positivism. Gardner, Legal
Positivism, supra note 5, at 213–14. And it brackets the question of indeterminacy. Id. at
211–12. For analysis of the indeterminacy problem by originalists, see Christopher R. Green,
Constitutional Theory and the Activismometer: How to Think About Indeterminacy, Restraint,
Vagueness, Executive Review, and Precedent, 54 Santa Clara L. Rev. 403, 408–15 (2014);
Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 859, 862–67 (1992).
247. Richard A. Posner, Response, Some Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards
and Livermore, 59 Duke L.J. 1177, 1181 (2010).
248. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1127, 1129 (1998).
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and argue that it settles the dispute. Proponents of various interpretive
methodologies each attempt to burden shift, claiming that their methodology is required by, or at least part of, “the law,” and the other side is
attempting to change the law.249 The general convention that judges
should enforce the law, whatever it is, makes it important to ﬁgure out
what the law is.
This kind of reasoning is latent in arguments about originalism and
judicial behavior too. Robert Post and Reva Siegel accuse originalism’s
proponents of seeking “relentlessly to change the Constitution without
recourse to Article V amendments.”250 By contrast, originalists generally
believe that judges may, or perhaps ought to, decide constitutional cases
in accordance with originalism. For example, Nelson Lund writes: “Supreme
Court Justices should just apply the law,” namely “originalism.”251
These views illuminate the stakes of originalism’s legal status. If I am
right that some form of originalism is the law, then the Post/Siegel critique loses force against that version of originalism. Originalism may sometimes result in individual practices or doctrines being modiﬁed, but not
because judges are changing the law. Judges are acting properly by using
such originalism, and indeed judges would be required to use it. By contrast, if originalism—or a more extreme form of it—is not the law, then
judges ought not use it in deciding cases.
For most lawyers the premise that judges should apply the law may
seem sufficiently obvious that it requires no further discussion. Yet having
just stressed a positive or descriptive account of law it may seem odd to
suggest that originalism’s legal status has important normative implications.252 Indeed, in some camps it is hotly debated whether most people
have any obligation to obey the law.253 But there are two good reasons to
249. See Matthew D. Adler, Social Facts, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Rule of
Recognition, in The Rule of Recognition, supra note 111, at 193, 206–09 (noting this pattern); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a
Jurisprudence of Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 St. Louis U. L.J. 865, 867 (2013)
(“The public face of judging in this country is positivism . . . .”).
250. Post & Siegel, supra note 238, at 557.
251. Nelson Lund, Stare Decisis and Originalism: Judicial Disengagement from the
Supreme Court’s Errors, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1029, 1029 (2012); see also Ian Bartrum,
Two Dogmas of Originalism, 7 Wash. U. Juris. Rev. 157, 179 (2015) (“[T]he originalist
protagonists of the 1980s seemed almost to take this point for granted.”); Berman & Toh,
New Originalism, supra note 13, at 547 (“Originalists . . . take for granted—[usually] implicitly in varying degrees—that the law that the Constitution imposes is equivalent to the
semantic contents of the inscriptions in the constitutional text, and, consequently, that
discerning the semantic contents of the constitutional text is equivalent to discovering the
constitutional law.”).
252. See Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments, supra note 77, at 643–45 (arguing little of
normative consequence follows from “brute fact” of positive acceptance).
253. See Alexander, Theories, supra note 4, at 642 (noting “one of the two most difficult questions in legal philosophy”: “[H]ow can we be obligated to comply with the law
when compliance conﬂicts with the deliverances of our ﬁrst-order practical reasoning?”).
For accounts, compare Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 Yale L.J.
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think that judges in particular have a prima facie obligation to give some
normative weight to the law.
One argument for this duty is promissory, and it has recently been
put forth at length by Richard Re.254 All judges take an oath to uphold
the Constitution and follow the law.255 Re argues that the oath gives the
Constitution normative force in our world because it is the solemn assertion of a promise, with all the moral force that a promise carries.256 (Of
course, many philosophers are skeptical about the moral force of promises too,257 suggesting that immoral promises or coerced promises might
lack moral weight. But Re bolsters his claim by turning to the democratic
context of the oath,258 which I consider shortly.)
The oath, Re argues, is a promise by the officeholder to obey the
public understanding of “this Constitution” at the time of the oath.259 If
so, the moral content of the constitutional promise is a positive question.
To ﬁgure out what officers are obligated to do tomorrow, we must look to
how our Constitution is understood today. This is important because it
demonstrates the stakes of the positive inquiry: What is the public understanding of “this Constitution?” If I am right that a form of originalism is
indeed our law today, then Re shows how this form of originalism can
have normative force.
For those who are skeptical of the promissory theory, there is also an
additional basis for this normative argument, grounded in democratic

1288 (2014) (arguing law changes our moral obligations), with Claus, supra note 88 (denying this), and Louis Michael Seidman, On Constitutional Disobedience (2012) (same).
254. Re, supra note 4, at 7–23; see also Christopher R. Green, Equal Citizenship, Civil
Rights, and the Constitution: The Original Sense of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
25–26 (2015) (providing valuable elaboration).
255. The actual text is:
I, _______ _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer
justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to
the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform
all the duties incumbent upon me as _______ under the Constitution
and laws of the United States. So help me God.
28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012). The “duties” mentioned in the oath have traditionally been understood to require judges to apply the law, as explained by Philip Hamburger, Law and
Judicial Duty 316–17 (2008).
256. Re, supra note 4, at 11–14.
257. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Was Dworkin an Originalist? 14–15 (Univ. of San
Diego Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 15-185, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576416
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“[C]onsenting or promising . . . carries no moral
weight.”); see also Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Limits of Legality: The Ethics of Lawless Judging
146–47 (2010) (“[M]oral reasons can undermine or override promissory obligations.”).
258. Re, supra note 4, at 15–23.
259. Id. at 23–36. The “time of the oath” constraint also raises important questions
about how judges should conduct themselves when legal revolutions post-date their oath
of office, see generally id. at 56–59, but that’s an issue I won’t tackle here.
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theory and judicial role.260 Judges exercise unusual government power to
do things that mere mortals often cannot rightly do. Judges can order
people locked up and rule their property and other rights away. What’s
more, they do so subject to minimal safeguards, usually subject to review
only by other judges.261 That power can only be justiﬁed as nontyrannical
as part of law, accompanied by a duty to obey the law. As Joseph Raz has
put it, “there can be no other way in which [judges] can justify imprisoning people, interfering with their property, jobs, family relations, and so
on.”262 Since judicial power is a construction of law in the ﬁrst place,
judges usurp power when they transgress the terms of the grant.
These arguments can also be combined. Democratic theory and judicial role help to explain why the oath is not illegitimately coercive. Re
says: “No hand—either dead or alive—forces individuals to run for office,
take the oath, or lead others to think that they will take ‘the Constitution’
seriously.”263 And the argument from judicial role is bolstered by the explicit promise judges make before assuming that role. As (Judge) Frank
Easterbrook has put it: “In exchange for receiving power and lifetime
tenure I agreed to limit the extent of my discretion.”264
These arguments do not claim that law has its own moral force. Rather, they claim that judges have duties to the law either because of the
promises they make or their power to act in the law’s name.
2. Its Limits. — This duty is not at all absolute. First, it is possible
that a judge’s duty to follow the law can be outweighed in some cases by
more pressing moral concerns.265 This means that the positive turn can
postpone and transform normative questions about interpretation, but it
cannot wholly eliminate them. Obeying the law is still a normative
choice.
260. See Brand-Ballard, supra note 257, 156, 157–78 (2010) (distinguishing arguments
grounded in “oath” from those grounded in “judicial role” and ﬁnding latter more
availing).
261. See Baude, Judgment Power, supra note 48, at 1810 (2008) (noting appeal and
other review processes “are internal to the Judiciary”).
262. Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions, in
Constitutionalism 152, 160 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998); see also Raz, Authority, supra note
80, at 237 (acknowledging promises and community status can produce special obligations
to obey law even if there is no general duty to obey law).
263. Re, supra note 4, at 16.
264. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1119, 1122 (1998).
265. See Brian Leiter, Book Review, 56 J. Legal Educ. 675, 677 (2006) (reviewing
Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006) and Exploring Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence
of Ronald Dworkin (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006)) (“Positivists have always been clear that a
judge’s legal duty to apply valid law can be overridden by moral or equitable considerations in any particular case . . . .”). See generally Amar, Unwritten Constitution, supra note
173, at 419–48 (arguing “conscience” can trump written law in speciﬁc circumstances);
Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 197–256 (1975)
(discussing when opposition to slavery could override obedience to law).
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For instance, if it turns out that all judges openly decide cases on the
basis of astrology, it does not follow that astrological judging is morally
obligatory, or even morally defensible. Astrology might be so irrational
that its conventional legal status is irrelevant. So if originalism is as irrational as astrology, presumably judges should ignore originalism even if it
is the law.266 Maybe so. But notice how much the positive turn has transformed the normative question. Rather than asking whether originalism
is the best way to constrain judges, or whether it will maximize human
welfare in the long run, we are now asking whether it is as bad as astrology. That is a burden of proof that most originalists would be happy to
rise to.
A different way in which the duty—especially the promissory variant—might be qualiﬁed is in cases where a person openly says, before
being selected as a judge, that he or she would defy the law in some
cases. Consider the example of Ninth Circuit Judge Harry Pregerson,
who was asked at his conﬁrmation hearing what he would do if the law
required a result “that offended your own conscience.”267 Pregerson replied: “I have to be honest with you. If I was faced with a situation like
that and it ran against my conscience, I would follow my conscience.”268 It
is possible that such a statement diminishes at least the promissory duty
to obey the law.269 Again, however, this is an unusual case; most judges do
not say that they would defy the law, and even Judge Pregerson did not
say that he would do so most of the time.
In sum, originalism’s legal status affects the channels of constitutional change. Legal status notwithstanding, it is surely possible to argue
that some other methodology that is not the law should be adopted. And
if these arguments work—if they result in widespread agreement about
the new methodology—then that methodology will be the law instead.
(One could say the same thing about political revolutions—what begins
as a coup can eventually become the new lawful authority.270)
But before these nonlawful methodologies have been adopted, arguments that they should be adopted for the ﬁrst time face an additional
hurdle that the current regime need not: the need to justify legal
266. Thanks to Alon Harel for making this argument to me. See Case, supra note 201,
at 449–50 (comparing originalism to astrology); Steven D. Smith, Decisional Originalism:
A Response to Critics, Library of Law & Liberty (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.
org/liberty-forum/decisional-originalism-a-response-to-critics [http://perma.cc/2WSJ-BQ
4Y] (comparing horoscopes and originalism).
267. Selection and Conﬁrmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 450 (1979) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson).
268. Id. (statement of J. Pregerson).
269. See Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Lori A. Ringhand, Supreme Court Conﬁrmation
Hearings and Constitutional Change 2 (2013) (celebrating conﬁrmation hearings as
mechanism of constitutional change); cf. Out of the Past (RKO Radio Pictures 1947) (“I
never told you I was anything but what I am. You just wanted to imagine I was.”).
270. Cf. Schauer, Force, supra note 74, at 83–85 (discussing revolutions that created
new legal authority).
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change.271 If the argument is addressed to a federal judge, it must overcome the claim that the judge would be violating his or her oath, breaking his or her promise to uphold the law. People could rightly complain,
“We commissioned you to enforce the law, and even to make law interstitially where necessary, but what makes you think that you can change the
law to something else?”
More generally, interpretive methods that are outside the legal space
will have to answer a normative question of institutional legitimacy. If the
method in question is a change in the law, why is the addressee of the
method the appropriate institution to engage in constitutional change?
(Should our current Senators engage in constitutional change? Our current President? And would the theorists be willing to subscribe to a consistent theory of constitutional change, or is it wholly opportunistic—e.g.
“the institutions that should engage in constitutional change are whichever ones agree with me and can get away with it?”) None of these questions are unanswerable. But if the positive turn moves forward, they will
be the next questions to be answered.
B.

What Does It Require or Forbid?

If judges have some obligation to follow the original meaning of the
Constitution, what practical effect does that obligation take? Originalism
obligates judges to a particular method of reasoning, both by placing the
original meaning at the top of the pyramid of authority and by providing
a test for which other methods may be used in the lower steps. This does
not necessarily rule out any particular result in any particular case as an
analytic matter, but it affects the kinds of arguments judges should consider.
As we have seen, the kinds of judicial reasoning that are in principle
consistent with an inclusive understanding of originalism are quite diverse. And while I have not tried to show that all American constitutional
interpretation has always been consistent with originalism, one might still
wonder what kinds of reasoning are excluded by it. In other words, what
kind of reasoning would—if adopted—falsify my claims?272
Consider this example: In 2007 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
published a book called Terror in the Balance, arguing that the executive
branch ought to receive broad constitutional deference in dealing with
national security emergencies.273 Their arguments were consequentialist
271. For an argument that such change may not be problematic, see Adam M. Samaha,
On the Problem of Legal Change, 103 Geo. L.J. 97, 142 (2014).
272. The question of what kinds of reasoning would falsify is separate from the question of how much of that reasoning is necessary to falsify, a harder question which I won’t
resolve here in light of the tentative and provocative nature of this Essay. See Hart, supra
note 80, at 144–47, for one possibility.
273. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and
the Courts (2007).
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ones and were met with a review by Gary Lawson who added that their
account also “tracks—albeit unwittingly—sound, originalist constitutional interpretation.”274 With admirable candor, however, Posner and
Vermeule declined the support, explaining that “Lawson’s approach is
hostage to the historical sources,” which they regarded as “an odd and
undesirable property.”275 They thus made clear that their normative argument rests on its own bottom, not on an originalist pedigree; that is the
kind of argument that I argue is excluded from our current law.
Similarly, inclusive originalism would diverge from the “common law
constitutionalism” put forward by David Strauss, under which judges reason based on a combination of tradition and moral judgment.276 Both
methods use precedent for much workaday adjudication, but there the
similarity ends. Common law constitutionalism affirmatively rejects the
primary authority of the Framers or the constitutional text,277 whereas
originalism depends on it.
The positive account also excludes some strong forms of originalism.
Steve Smith, for example, memorably advocates for the retrieval of
“[t]hat Old-Time Originalism,” which operates at a narrow level of abstraction, looks to the intent of the Framers, and rejects some more ﬂuid
interpretive moves as philosophers’ tricks.278 Other originalists insist on a
version of originalism that largely excludes the use of precedent, or at
least of nonoriginalist precedent.279 These versions of originalism also
face a positive challenge. They probably cannot be derived from our current practices. Those current practices ﬁnd ambiguity and resort to precedent too frequently for old-fashioned, speciﬁc originalism to be the law
in itself.
Hence, under the positive account of originalism, judges are not at
liberty to adopt either of these kinds of theories unless they do one of
two things: They must either conclude that as a matter of historical evidence and originalist analysis that the proposed theory is in fact correctly
entailed by inclusive originalism—i.e. that it is the one that is consistent
274. Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times
of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 289, 293 (2007).
275. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Originalism and Emergencies: A Reply to
Lawson, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 313, 317 (2007).
276. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev.
877 (1996).
277. See id. at 886–87, 904–05 (“The vision of the common law is precisely that the law
is the product not of a few exceptional lawgivers (or one lawyering generation), but of
many generations of lawyers and judges.”).
278. See Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in The Challenge of Originalism:
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation 223, 223–24 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W.
Miller eds., 2011) (arguing for less “philosophical sophistication” in originalist interpretation). For related views, see Alicea, supra note 10, at 149–52 (arguing against originalist
methods which “reject[] the authority of the past and the duties rightfully imposed by our
forebears”).
279. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing several such originalists).
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with the Founding-era practices. Or they must self-consciously engage in
legal change or legal restoration—and confront the normative problems
that raises.
C.

Originalism’s Contingency

Understanding originalism in a positive light also informs how we
ought to think about interpretation of foreign and state constitutions.
These practices can each be “right” in their own legal cultures without
casting serious doubt on the authority of others. Of course one might
learn much about the wisdom of various methods of constitutional interpretation by studying what others do, but the legal authority of each
method is contingent on local social facts.
1. State Constitutions. — Many scholars seem to assume that the case
for originalism in state constitutional law simply mirrors that for originalism in federal constitutional law. For example, one of the leading books
on state constitutional interpretation discusses originalism as a parallel to
the federal debate.280 Other originalists imply in passing that the two
might be distinguishable,281 but the principles of distinction have not
been ﬂeshed out. Understanding the positivist premise for originalist decisionmaking helps us to understand whether existing state constitutional
practice should be originalist.
If the case for originalism rests on facts like “having a written constitution,” and “having a form of popularly enacted higher law,” then that
case for originalism applies with the same force to state constitutions,
which are also written and enacted popularly as a form of higher law. (At
least they are today—Jack Rakove has observed that the ﬁrst postrevolutionary constitutions were promulgated legislatively and therefore
not thought to bind the legislature more than any other statute.282)
On the other hand, if the case for originalism rests on normative
claims like the Constitution’s association with liberty or desirable enactment procedure, or the need to constrain unelected federal judges, these
facts may be contingent. Some state constitutions are more protective of
liberty than others and they are enacted and amended in different
ways;283 and some are interpreted by elected judges.284
280. G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions 194–99 (1998) (drawing comparisons between state constitutions and federal Constitution in originalism analysis).
281. E.g., Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 Va. L.
Rev. 1, 25–28 (2015).
282. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings 96–108 (1996) (discussing adoption by “surrogate legislatures”); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 Fordham L. Rev.
1587, 1603–04 (1997) (same).
283. See G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Design and State Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 Mont. L. Rev. 7, 14–15 (2011) (describing variation in “changeability”
among state constitutions).
284. Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115
Penn St. L. Rev. 837, 849–50 (2011).
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If positivist originalism is correct, then the answer will turn on each
state’s political and legal culture.285 For example, Connecticut courts regularly declare that their “state constitution is an instrument of progress . . . and should not be interpreted too narrowly or too literally.”286
Delaware courts say that “constitutional law to some extent may be likened to a progressive science” that turns on “the present day meaning of
the particular language.”287 Meanwhile, the Michigan Supreme Court’s
“goal in construing our Constitution is to discern the original meaning
attributed to the words of a constitutional provision by its ratiﬁers.”288 If
these judicial statements indeed reﬂect the law of those states, then perhaps originalism is the duty of judges in Michigan, and not in
Connecticut.
2. Foreign Constitutions. — The positive turn also helps us understand the diversity of interpretive practices in other constitutional systems. The standard report is that “[o]riginalism is mostly unknown outside of the United States,”289 or at least that “[o]riginalism has less traction in many other countries.”290 And this report is supposed to discomﬁt
American originalists, by showing that originalism is not inherent in the
nature of a written constitution291 and that originalism is not “uniquely
suited to judicial review of a written constitution in a democracy.”292 The
positive turn helps to show why the foreign experience should not be so
discomﬁtting.
First, once we focus on inclusive, and not merely exclusive, originalism, some other putatively nonoriginalist countries might be originalist
after all.293 Canadian constitutional doctrine, for example, explicitly in-

285. See James A. Gardner, Interpreting State Constitutions 226–27 (2005) (“[T]he
search for a methodology of state constitutional interpretation must begin with the question: what function have the people of the state in fact assigned to their courts?”).
286. State v. Jenkins, 3 A.3d 806, 854 (Conn. 2010). The phrase seems to have originated in State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10, 19 (Conn. 1988).
287. State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514, 516 (Del. 1963) (cited in Dukes, 547 A.2d at 19).
288. People v. Nutt, 677 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Mich. 2004).
289. Jack Balkin, Why Are Americans Originalist?, in Law, Society and Community:
Socio-Legal Essays in Honour of Roger Cotterrell 309, 309 (Richard Nobles & David Schiff
eds., 2015) [hereinafter Balkin, Americans]; see also Kim Lane Scheppele, Jack Balkin Is
an American, 25 Yale J.L. & Human. 23 (2013) (highlighting originalism as “distinctively
American”).
290. Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law 652 (2d ed.
2006).
291. See Coan, supra note 2, at 1068–70 (describing large democracies with written
constitutions but without originalism).
292. Greene, Origins, supra note 89, at 62.
293. See Balkin, Americans, supra note 289, at 309–10 (distinguishing between “thin
version of original meaning” and version offering “exclusive approach to interpretation”—the version “that mystiﬁes many lawyers and judges outside the United States”).
But see Coan, supra note 2, at 1070 n.162 (“This seems exceedingly unlikely.”).
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vokes a metaphor of the law as a “living tree.”294 External observers generally reject any role for originalism in Canadian law,295 and so do internal observers.296 And yet the doctrine might be squared with inclusive
originalism, because the “living tree” phrase long predates the current
1982 Constitution Act. One could therefore argue that the original meaning of the act incorporated the living tree metaphor.297
Yet there do still seem to be some examples of countries that are not
originalist even in the inclusive sense, because their legal regime has
open transgressions against original meaning. For instance, in “an all too
well-known classical example,”298 the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic
of France contained a preamble that was well understood not to be a formal part of the legally operative constitutional text.299 But in 1971, the
French Constitutional Council nonetheless gave the preamble operative
force and declared proposed legislation to violate a principle of freedom
of association it found in the preamble.300 According to one scholar, “this
decision changed entirely the substance of formal constitutional law” and
amounted to “no less than a revolution in the legal meaning of the
word.”301
294. Edwards v. Attorney General (Persons), [1930] AC 124, 136 (Can. P.C.) (appeal
taken from S.C.C.); see also Re Same Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, para. 22 (Can.).
295. See Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev.
815, 839 (highlighting Canada’s lack of interest in originalism); Greene, Origins, supra
note 89, at 20–40 (explaining living nature of Canada’s Charter); Mark Tushnet, The
Charter’s Inﬂuence Around the World, 50 Osgoode Hall L.J. 527, 540 (2013) (discussing
Canada’s “living tree” constitutional philosophy).
296. E.g., Peter W. Hogg, Canada: Privy Council to Supreme Court, in Interpreting
Constitutions: A Comparative Study 55, 83 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006) (“Originalism
has never enjoyed any signiﬁcant support in Canada.”).
297. See Joel C. Bakan, Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy in
Canadian Constitutional Thought, 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 123, 148–53 (1989) (discussing
methods of Canadian constitutional interpretation); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions
as “Living Trees”? Comparative Constitutional Law and Interpretive Metaphors, 75 Fordham
L. Rev. 921, 947–54 (2006) (discussing historical basis and boundaries of “living tree”
metaphor).
298. Otto Pfersmann, The Only Constitution and Its Many Enemies, in Constitutional
Topography: Values and Constitutions 45, 60 (András Sajó & Renáta Uitz eds., 2010).
299. 1958 Const. pmbl. (Fr.), available in translation at http://www.conseil-constitutio
nnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf
[http://perma.cc/33Z2-2RZA]; see Travaux préparatoires de la Constitution du 4 Octobre
1958 (cited in Alec Stone Sweet, The Juridical Coup d’Etat and the Problem of Authority,
8 Ger. L.J. 915, 922 n.20 (2007)).
300. See Conseil constitutionel [CC] [Constitutional Court] décision No. 71-44 DC,
July 16, 1971, J.O. 7114 (Fr.); cf. Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 Ind. L.J.
1133, 1142 n.41 (2014) (noting this case is outlier and globally preambles have not generally been thought justiciable).
301. Pfersmann, supra note 298, at 60. For similar assessments, see Stone Sweet, supra
note 299, at 922 (describing this development as “juridical coup d’etat”); Louis Henkin,
Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 La. L. Rev. 1023, 1046–47 (1989) (“Constitutional review
in France today is probably not what the framers of the French Constitution contemplated.”).
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Similar examples are noted in interpretation of the German
Constitution and the Treaty of Rome.302 And one might also include the
new regime of Israeli constitutionalism brought forth by Chief Justice
Aharon Barak, who has himself described it as a “constitutional revolution,”303 and which appears not to claim any serious legal pedigree to the
original legal meaning of the Basic Laws.304
Each of these examples could be investigated on its own terms. They
are meant only to show that there seem to be a diversity of practices. On
the other side, originalism is a part of Australian constitutional debate,
though it appears embattled.305 And a few scholars have recently argued
that originalism is an important part of the constitutional culture in
other places, such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Singapore.306
The implication of the positive turn is to lower the stakes of this
comparative originalism. As with state constitutions, grounding original302. Stone Sweet, supra note 299, 919–22, 924–27 (giving these as other examples of
“juridicial coup d’état”). For yet another example elsewhere, see S.P. Sathe, India: From
Positivism to Structuralism, in Interpreting Constitutions, supra note 296, at 245.
303. Aharon Barak, HaMahapecha HaHukatit: Zechuyot Adam Muganot [The
Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights], 1 Law & Gov’t in Isr. 9 (1992–1993)
(quoted in Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli
Challenge in American Perspective, 26 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 309, 311 (1995)); see also
Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat, Public Law in Israel 47–48 (1996) (describing revolutionary
success of Israeli Supreme Court in forging “remarkable statement of basic rights and
freedoms”).
304. See Barak Cohen, Empowering Constitutionalism with Text from an Israeli
Perspective, 18 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 585, 635–36 (2003) (“The fact that the Israeli judiciary
ultimately holds responsibility for evaluating subsequently passed Basic Laws against this
highly subjective norm imbues the two new Basic Laws with a previously unrealized supralegislative potential for judicial review.”); Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences
of Unplanned Constitutional Reform: Constitutional Politics in Israel, 44 Am. J. Comp. L.
585, 591–99 (1996) (“[T]he High Court was able, by judicial interpretation and judicial
activism, to establish in the case law several universal individual and human rights, of the
kind that are usually entrenched in national constitutions elsewhere.”); Barak Medina,
Four Myths of Judicial Review: A Response to Richard Posner’s Critique of Aharon Barak’s
Judicial Activism, 49 Harv. Int’l. L.J. Online 1, 2–3 (2007), available at http://law.huji.ac.
il/upload/Medina_response_to_Posner1.pdf [http://perma.cc/3MUJ-7U2F]. But see Hon.
Dalia Dorner, Does Israel Have a Constitution?, 43 St. Louis U. L.J. 1325, 1329–30 (1999)
(making textual argument).
305. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Australia: Devotion to Legalism 144–52, in Interpreting
Constitutions, supra note 296, at 106; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional
Interpretation, 25 Fed. L. Rev. 1 (1997) (arguing Australia has “no tradition of nonoriginalist interpretation”); see also Greene, Origins, supra note 89, at 41–62 (calling
Australian originalism “faint-hearted”). These sources should be noted with the caveat,
thanks to David Fontana, Comparative Originalism, 88 Tex. L. Rev. See Also 189, 192–93
(2010), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Fontana-88-TLRSA-189.pdf [http://
perma.cc/QZ8Q-R2NG] that one not confuse what foreign scholars say with what foreign
courts do.
306. See Yvonne Tew, Originalism at Home and Abroad, 51 Colum. J. Transnat’l L.
780, 800–31 (2014) (describing constitutional culture in Malaysia and Singapore); Ozan
O. Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 Vand. J.
Transnat’l L. 1239, 1252–87 (2011) (describing constitutional culture in Turkey).
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ism in positive law allows originalists to acknowledge some foreign practices as nonoriginalist without having to argue that they are conceptually
incoherent or lead to the supposedly bad consequences of nonoriginalism. Indeed, a positivist originalist might say that when in Rome one
ought to do as Romans do.
IV. CODA: AN ALTERNATIVE TAKE ON THE POSITIVE TURN
The bulk of this Essay argued for a middle position—that originalism (inclusive of other methodologies consistent with originalism)—is
our law. But that claim is certainly not airtight. What should one conclude if one is not fully persuaded by the descriptive claim?
The same evidence canvassed above, should still lead the skeptic to
conclude that originalism is at least part of the law. (This is the postponed claim (3) from our initial taxonomy.) Mitch Berman describes as
nearly universal the view that original meaning is “relevant” and acknowledges that total rejection of originalism “is not a live competitor in contemporary debates.”307 Michael Dorf writes that “virtually all practitioners
of and commentators on constitutional law accept that original meaning
has some relevance to constitutional interpretation.”308 Philip Bobbitt includes it as one of the primary “modalities” of constitutional argument.309
Lawrence Solum amasses further evidence.310 On this picture, presumably precedent, practice, moral justice, or other things are also part of the
law—parts that operate independently of their originalist pedigree.
But even so, there might not be that many parts. Theories of our constitutional practice that list a larger number of competing components of
the law often stop at a handful. Richard Fallon counts ﬁve (text, original
intent, “theory,” precedent, and policy).311 Phillip Bobbitt counts six (dropping “theory” and “policy,” and adding “structure,” “prudence,” and
“ethics”).312 And depending on one’s speciﬁc points of departure, one
might not need even that many. Even for skeptics of the preceding account: Are there any important legal commitments we have that cannot
be encompassed by originalism and precedent? Or perhaps originalism
plus a boldly dynamic Equal Protection Clause?
307. Berman, Bunk, supra note 1, at 10 n.21.
308. Michael Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The
Case of Original Meaning, 85 Geo. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997).
309. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 12–22 (1982)
[hereinafter Bobbitt, Fate]. Bobbitt calls it the “historical modality,” which he distinguishes from the “textual modality.” There is much to quibble with in his descriptions, but
my point is only that he does not deny its status as a mode of legal argument in the United
States.
310. Solum, Semantic, supra note 80, at 2–12 (arguing rules of constitutional law include at least some content “ﬁxed by the original public meaning of the text”).
311. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence Theory, supra note 12, at 1194.
312. Bobbitt, Fate, supra note 309, at 7–8, 93.
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In any event, however many modalities or components one ﬁnds,
the positive inquiry can make some progress in that world. The idea that
originalism is one legitimate factor among several others may seem banal, but I make two nonbanal claims about it. First, even if our law contains multiple independent components or modalities, no judge is actually required to use them. In other words, in a world of methodological
pluralism, methodological pluralism is not necessarily required. Second,
my previous claims about judicial duty still limit the scope of judicial discretion.
A.

Is Methodological Pluralism Required?

If inclusive originalism and some additional nonincluded methods
are both part of the law, are judges legally required to use both, or may
they instead choose to use one method exclusively? I think the best account of our practices is that pluralism is not required.
For pluralism to be legally required would mean that there is some legal rule (we might call it a “meta-rule”) governing how the different
components of the law interact. The argument in Part II—now rejected
by assumption—could be recast in terms of a meta-rule that originalism
is the criterion for other methodologies. If that is not the meta-rule, is
there a different one?
Phillip Bobbitt’s position is not entirely clear, but he can be read to
argue that there is. On one hand, he purports to reject the “enterprise of
providing a meta-rule that would resolve conﬂicts among the modalities”313 and has recently reaffirmed: “My own answer is that there is no
hierarchy of modal forms.”314 (“Modalities” are what Bobbitt calls the
different techniques for constructing constitutional law.)
On the other hand, what Bobbitt appears to mean by this is not that
there are no meta-rules at all, but rather that there is a meta-rule forbidding hierarchy. He says that elevating a single modality is to “construct an
ideology,” which is “mistaken.”315 And he recently wrote of the “unfortunate habit of ‘ideologizing’ a particular mode as the one true method of
constitutional interpretation, though one sees this more in the academy
than on the bench.”316 If there were no meta-rule at all, there would be
313. Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 11, at 155.
314. Phillip C. Bobbitt, The Age of Consent, 123 Yale L.J. 2334, 2372 (2014) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Consent]; see also Bobbitt, Fate, supra note 309, at 58 (“[Modalities] do not
seem to mesh with each other and do not join issue on a common ground according to
common rules.”).
315. Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 11, at 22; see also J.M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1771, 1790 (1994) (“Bobbitt believes
that orginalists make a fundamental mistake. They convert what is only one modality of
constitutional argument into a criterion for all constitutional interpretation.”).
316. Bobbitt, Consent, supra note 314, at 2370 n.137. For more instances of ambiguity,
compare Philip Bobbitt, Reﬂections Inspired by My Critics, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1869, 1874
(1994) (“I reserved the resolution of such conﬂicts for the conscience of the decider.”),
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nothing wrong with “ideologizing” one mode, even if others were not required to agree. To be sure, Bobbitt may intend this criticism of “ideology” as a freestanding normative argument, not a legal argument. But if
that is so, it is not clear what would give this argument force, if law does
not.
In any event, if there is a legal duty to be a pluralist, this has important implications. If originalism is only part of the law, and if it is also
legally required to give some consideration to other modalities, then it is
not lawful for a government official to be a hardcore originalist. (Indeed,
Bobbitt seems to say that Judge Robert Bork should not have been conﬁrmed as a Supreme Court Justice because he privileged one modality
over all the others.317) On this view, one not only may, but must, allow
other considerations to temper orginalism in some fashions.
It is not clear that all of the current members of the Supreme Court
could satisfy this requirement. Take Justice Scalia: He once famously described himself as a “faint-hearted originalist,” noting that even though
the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause (as
he understood it) permitted the imposition of ﬂogging, he would not
vote to uphold ﬂogging as a punishment.318 But in more recent years,
Justice Scalia has recanted. In a July 2011 interview recounted in May 2013
by Marcia Coyle, “Scalia said he has ‘recanted’ being a ‘faint-hearted originalist.’ ‘I think I would vote to uphold it if there were a state law providing for notching of ears. I think I would say it’s a stupid idea but it’s not
unconstitutional.’”319 Scalia’s recantation implies that his commitment to
originalism will always dominate his policy or moral judgments—included in what Bobbitt would call the “prudential” or “ethical” modalities.320
To be sure, Justice Scalia also continues to adhere to precedent. He
has written that “stare decisis is not part of my originalist philosophy; it is a
pragmatic exception to it,”321 and he has continued to adhere to this external view of precedent even after his recantation.322 It is not clear that he
needs to make this concession—as we have seen, most theories of originalism tolerate a certain amount of constitutional precedent—so it is
not clear that he should really be taken as adhering to two separate mowith id. (“Of course, the decider had to be conscientious in the ﬁrst place.”). See also
Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities, supra note 11, at 159 & n.13 (discussing Bobbitt’s
conception of “conscience”).
317. See Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 11, at 106–10 (“[T]he constitutional case
against the nomination had been made.”); see also Balkin & Levinson, supra note 315, at
1793–94 (interpreting this passage).
318. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 849, 864 (1989)
[hereinafter Scalia, Lesser Evil].
319. Marcia Coyle, The Roberts Court: The Struggle for the Constitution 165 (2013).
320. See generally Bobbitt, Fate, supra note 309, at 59–73, 93–122.
321. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 140 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
322. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 414 (2012) (“[Stare decisis]
is an exception to textualism . . . born not of logic but of necessity.”). But see also id.
(“Stare decisis has been a part of our law from time immemorial . . . .”).
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dalities.323 But in any event, by expressly subordinating other forms of
reasoning to precedent and originalism, Justice Scalia seems to reject
modern pluralism.
Similarly, Justice Clarence Thomas is even more well known for his
elevation of the original meaning of the Constitution as the ultimate
method of constitutional decisionmaking. Some have claimed that he
does not believe in precedent at all, and while this is an exaggeration, his
views seem to raise the pluralist challenge even more starkly. Is either
Justice making some kind of legal error in elevating original meaning
over other, nonderivative forms of legal argument?
I do not think so. Even if inclusive originalism is not the only rule of
constitutional law, the evidence discussed in Part II still suggests enough
to defeat the claim that some form of eclecticism is required. On the evidentiary standards that would reject my claim that originalism is the ultimate law, I doubt one could ﬁnd sufficient agreement on any other metarule today, even a meta-rule forbidding hierarchy among the
modalities.324
If there is no such meta-rule, then when it comes to interpretive contestation, we are in an area “partly unregulated by the law.”325 Larry
Alexander has expressed pessimism about such contestation, arguing
that without a meta-rule “when two opposed lawyers invoke different modalities as constituting ‘the law,’ either they are arguing past each other,
or else they are urging the court to choose, perhaps for this case only,
their favored modality.”326 Indeed, says Alexander, “each modality represents a different Constitution . . . . [B]ecause it is incredible to believe
that advocates are invoking a modality—a Constitution—and asking the
court to choose it for this case only, the modalities conception collapses.”327
If this pessimism pushes one to accept the stronger claim advanced
in Part II, so much the better.328 But if we do have different competing
legal regimes, then the contested issues in constitutional law will take

323. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Judge Posner’s Simple Law, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 777, 804
(2015) (“[N]either Scalia nor Garner is a legal theorist, and many things they say that
touch on theory are just confused. So some charitable reconstruction is called for.”).
324. See Adler, Contestation, supra note 77, at 1121–24 (summarizing deep contestation over interpretive methodology); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 315, at 1790 (“[T]here
may be no consensus concerning whether debates about the legitimate forms of constitutional argument are themselves a legitimate part of constitutional discourse.”).
325. Hart, supra note 80, at 272–76.
326. Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 Const. Comment. 139, 146–47 (2010) [hereinafter Alexander, Telepathic].
327. Id. at 147. For a counterpoint, see Berman & Toh, Combinability, supra note 13,
at 1762–84 (arguing there is nothing incoherent about absence of a meta-rule).
328. Accord Alexander, Telepathic, supra note 326, at 147 (“At most, considerations of
justice can be invoked when an authoritative standard needs to be given content, or invoked as evidence of original meaning. All of the other modalities mentioned by Bobbitt
and others, can, I believe, be shown to be derivative of original meaning or precedent.”).
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place on nonlegal terms.329 Participants can still try to convince others to
adopt their interpretive methodology, using whatever nonpositivist arguments for adoption are persuasive. (And of course they can also try to
convince others that there really is a legal agreement at bottom.) But law
has by hypothesis run out.
In the end, this means that even if our constitutional law is not entirely originalist, a judge is legally entitled to be an originalist nonetheless—or to be a pluralist, or something in between. The positive turn neither compels nor forbids a form of originalism.
B.

The Boundaries of Comparison (Originalism and the Bear Principle)

The positive turn provides boundaries to the kinds of nonlegal arguments one must make to defend or attack originalism. For example, once
legal arguments run out, one might pick between legal interpretive methods based on whether they will promote national well-being, suppress
judicial manipulation (i.e., “constrain judges”), or cohere with principles
of popular sovereignty. (I will call such nonlegal arguments “normative”
arguments, but I don’t mean to exclude other kinds of nonlegal arguments one might imagine.) But originalism’s status as law affects the way
such arguments should be made.
Originalists are known to invoke what I call “the bear principle.”330
Like one of two hunters ﬂeeing a hungry bear, originalism can say: “I
don’t have to outrun the bear; I just have to outrun you.”331 In other words,
originalism’s ability to produce good outcomes, constrain judges, or implement democratic values must be judged on a relative basis.
But relative to what? In many institutional contexts, arguments will
implicitly be limited to those methods that are currently lawful. In such a
context, the normative arguments for originalism need not render it superior to all conceivable competitors. It need only be superior to other
competitors that are also part of the law.
Once again, this reframes and narrows the normative arguments relevant to originalism. Originalism’s defenders need not argue that the
method is the only way, or even the best way, to adhere to popular sovereignty. They need merely argue that it is a better way than using precedent
or practice. They need not argue that it is the only way, or even the best
way, to constrain judges. They need merely argue that the better ways
329. See Brian Leiter, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court as
Super-Legislature, 66 Hastings L.J. 1601, 1601 (2015) (arguing “there is very little actual
‘law’ in federal constitutional law in the United States” and Supreme Court therefore “operates as a kind of super-legislature, albeit one with limited jurisdiction.”).
330. Baude, Bear Principle, supra note 221.
331. Id. Versions of the bear joke are regularly told by Justice Scalia. See Stephen
Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: The Yale Lectures, 120 Yale L.J. 1999, 2014 (2011);
Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1025, 1034 (2011). He has put the
point less colorfully in print. See Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 318, at 855.
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(like Waldronian abolition of judicial review332) are outside the bounds
of our current legal practice.
This is why, for instance, Justice Breyer emphasizes that his pragmatic alternative to originalism has “well-established, traditionally American
roots.”333 So one might answer the question “must [originalism] be defended empirically?”334 by saying: “only against other methodologies that
have similar legal support in our legal practice.”
CONCLUSION
Is originalism our law? The resolution of that dispute turns out to be
critical to debates about how judges should behave, and yet it is a dispute
that most originalist scholarship ignores. On balance, I think the answer
is “yes.”
Although, at a surface level, many of our existing legal practices may
seem to be inconsistent with an exclusive adherence to original meaning,
the inconsistency is largely illusory. The best account of our legal practices points toward a certain kind of originalism, an inclusive but nonpluralist one, as the trumping criterion of constitutional law.
This positive turn answers the dead-hand argument famously leveled
against originalism: The earth belongs to the living, so why should constitutional law be controlled by the decisions of the dead? The original
meaning of the Constitution continues to control precisely because we
the living continue to treat it as law and use the legal institutions it
makes, and we do so in official continuity with the document’s past. So
the decisions of the dead still govern, but only because we the living, for
reasons of our own, receive them as law.

332. Eric Posner, Originalism Class 7: The Evolving Constitution, at http://ericposner.
com/originalism-class-7-alternatives-to-originalism/ [http://perma.cc/MY8U-R328] (“I
prefer Waldron’s view that judicial review should be junked altogether . . . . Alas, Waldron’s
position is as remote from American reality as Mars.” (discussing Jeremy Waldron, The
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006))).
333. Breyer, supra note 331, at 2014.
334. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 636, 657–58 (1999).

